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INTRODUCTION
What do we mean by a right to life? Should—or does—such
a right cover only antiabortion claims? Or should the term
apply more broadly—to debates about class and welfare, about
the death penalty, or even about human rights? In the abortion
wars, litigation strategy has helped to dictate the answers to
these questions. Historians and legal scholars have studied the
tensions between lawyers and the lay actors they represent,
chronicling how lawyers modify and even limit the social
changes activists demand.1 By putting the attorney-client
relationship center stage, scholars have sometimes obscured an
equally important story about how litigation strategy—as in
the case of the antiabortion movement—can make a difference
to internal battles about the meaning of a social cause. This
Article explores the influence of litigation on a different
struggle, one involving a movement’s constitutional vision and
place in American politics. The Article uses the history of the
antiabortion movement as an entry point for rethinking the
role of litigation in the politics of social-movement identity,
recovering how court-centered strategies transformed the
meaning of a right to life. This history shows that victories in
court can convince both lay actors and lawyers to discount
alternative political identities and constitutional commitments,
creating winners and losers in internal struggles over what
defines a movement.
Prior to and even after the decision of Roe v. Wade,2 a
diverse group of lay activists and legal professionals argued for
a right to life, supposedly rooted in the Declaration of
Independence, human rights law, and even the Supreme
Court’s privacy jurisprudence. While movement members
agreed on the importance of using rights language and
1. For examples of key studies showcasing the complexity of the attorneyclient relationship, see generally MARK BRILLANT, THE COLOR OF AMERICA HAS
CHANGED: HOW RACIAL DIVERSITY SHAPED CIVIL RIGHTS REFORM IN CALIFORNIA,
1941–1976 (2012); TOMIKO BROWN-NAGIN, COURAGE TO DISSENT: ATLANTA AND
THE LONG HISTORY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (2012); RISA GOLUBOFF, THE
LOST PROMISE OF CIVIL RIGHTS (2007); NANCY MACLEAN, FREEDOM IS NOT
ENOUGH: THE OPENING OF THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE (2008); SERENA MAYERI,
REASONING FROM RACE: FEMINISM, LAW, AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION
(2011); THOMAS J. SUGRUE, SWEET LAND OF LIBERTY: THE FORGOTTEN STRUGGLE
FOR CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE NORTH (2009).
2. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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reaffirming constitutional protections for the fetus, this
apparent consensus concealed deeper fights about the meaning
of a right to life. Because they disagreed about the identity of
their movement, competing activists found themselves deeply
divided about the kind of law reform agenda they should
formulate and the kind of allies they should pursue. In
particular, activists fought about whether to align with the
political Right or Left.
Success in court proved to be a tipping point in internal
battles over movement identity, empowering social
conservative advocates who opposed “big government.” When
an incremental litigation strategy made headway in the
Supreme Court, movement members rallied around strategies
centered on success in court. In the legislative arena,
movement members prioritized regulations that the Supreme
Court might uphold, thereby chipping away at abortion rights,
exposing the supposed overreach of the Supreme Court, and
highlighting the supposed incoherence of the Roe decision. Over
time, as abortion opponents channeled more resources into this
strategy, the movement had reason to align with conservative
organizations committed to small government and opposed to
judicial decisions restricting school prayer and mandating
busing. Victory in court strengthened the hand of some
movement members and marginalized others.
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I lays out the long
history of claims based on a right to life, and traces the shifting
arguments that shaped dialogue about the New Deal order, the
Cold War, and the poverty rights movement. Part II chronicles
how these existing political and social divisions over the right
to life fractured the early antiabortion movement. Some
activists connected antiabortion beliefs to an understanding of
the right to life similar to that elaborated during the Cold War,
a right that included defense of the traditional family and war
on the sexual revolution. Others strongly disagreed. These
activists built on the meaning of a right to life as elaborated
during the New Deal to assert that protection of the fetus
naturally extended to other vulnerable persons, including
single mothers and the poor. By contesting what a right to life
meant, abortion opponents shaped the kind of political alliance
they would seek, the legal goals they would prioritize, and the
recruits they could attract.
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Part III examines how litigation strategies fundamentally
changed the course of identity contests in the antiabortion
movement. In particular, this Part looks at new tactics
developed by antiabortion attorneys in Chicago. These lawyers
paid lip service to the legitimacy of the Supreme Court and the
precedential value of the Roe v. Wade decision,3 all the while
seeking to hollow out the Roe decision and reveal its logical
shortcomings. When this strategy seemed to succeed,
movement leaders applied it more broadly, focusing on the
courts. As activists became preoccupied with overruling Roe, it
became more appealing to align with groups concerned about
judicial activism.
Part IV positions this narrative in the larger scholarship
on law and social change. First, the history studied in this
Article reinforces scholars’ concerns about the dark side of
winning in court. Even when litigation does not sideline
movement radicals or discourage activists from pursuing more
effective grassroots strategies, success in court can convince
activists to swear off alternative visions of a cause. Victory in
court, moreover, can create substantial path dependence,
making it more costly and difficult to create a new identity and
employ different tactics rather than to pursue established
ones.4
Second, this history significantly contributes to studies on
the impact of rights rhetoric5 on social movements. The story of
antiabortion constitutionalism builds on work highlighting the
differing effects of rights rhetoric and litigation. By focusing on
rights, competing antiabortion activists could make a
remarkably fluid set of demands on the institutional status
quo, both challenging and justifying existing privileges and
Id.
See generally JACOB S. HACKER, THE DIVIDED WELFARE STATE: THE
BATTLE OVER PUBLIC AND PRIVATE BENEFITS IN THE UNITED STATES 53–54 (2002)
(defining path dependent outcomes as “developmental trajectories that are
inherently difficult to reverse”). Because of the inertia associated with path
dependence, it may encourage activists to adopt strategies that do not fully
address contemporary political realities. See id.; see also Oona Hathaway, Path
Dependence in the Legal System: The Course and Pattern of Change in the
Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 607, 616 (2001) (explaining how
“developments in the past constrain the processes of change in important and
predictable ways”).
5. By rights rhetoric, I refer to efforts to frame a claim, identity, or demand
by reference to a fundamental (and often constitutional) right.
3.
4.
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hierarchies. Indeed, it was in moving away from the language
of legal rights that movement members adopted a narrower
vision—and
one
certainly
more
disconnected
from
socioeconomic equality. At the same time, litigation itself
tended to have a constraining effect, particularly since the
movement lacked the public support to achieve its goals in the
political arena. Lay actors and lawyers alike stayed away from
arguments thought likely to jeopardize litigation strategies,
and in the process narrowed their demands, pushed important
arguments below the surface, and silenced voices once
influential in movement circles.
I.

CHARTING A RIGHT TO LIFE UNRELATED TO ABORTION,
1930–1973

Does the rhetoric of legal rights constrain movements for
social change? The history of the antiabortion movement
contributes to a larger scholarly debate about whether rights
rhetoric stunts or expands movements for social change. While
some legal and political philosophers insist that rights be taken
seriously as a basis for jurisprudence,6 other commentators
question whether rights have any stable or objective content,
calling attention to the expansion of judicial rights and “the
endurance of the injustices that rights purported to
address . . . .”7 Examining antiabortion constitutional change
6. See Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment:
Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV.
1331 (1988); Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and
Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323 (1987); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The
Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives from the Women’s Movement, 61
N.Y.U. L. REV. 589, 651 (1986) (arguing that in the case of the women’s
movement, “[r]ights discourse encouraged the articulation of feminist vision and
furthered the process of political assertion”); Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical
Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 401, 415 (1987) (arguing that “the attainment of rights signifies the due, the
respectful behavior, the collective responsibility properly owed by a society to one
of its own”).
7. See Karen Tani, Rights and Welfare Before the Movement: Rights as a
Language of the State, 122 YALE L.J. 314, 370 (2012). Conservative critics have
insisted that excessive use of rights talk destroyed community and hobbled
institutions. See, e.g., FRED P. GRAHAM, THE SELF-INFLICTED WOUND (1970);
RICHARD E. MORGAN, DISABLING AMERICA: THE “RIGHTS INDUSTRY” IN OUR TIME
(1984); AMITAI ETZIONI, THE SPIRIT OF COMMUNITY: RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES,
AND THE COMMUNITARIAN AGENDA (1993); MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK:
THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE 14–15 (1991). Critics on the left,
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campaigns from the 1960s to the 1980s demonstrates the
surprising mutability of a “right to life.” Across time, a diverse
group of activists used rights rhetoric to advance strikingly
different agendas. Though often thought to offer hollow hope
for change activists, rights rhetoric gave abortion opponents a
crucial focal point for debate about movement identity.
Far from ratifying established hierarchies, some abortion
opponents used rights language to demand changes to the
distribution of wealth and the role of government in providing
for the poor. Others deployed rights rhetoric in a fight for the
status quo, defending the privileges of the traditional family
and praising small government. Rights rhetoric emerges as
fluid in its uses and impact. The history of the antiabortion
movement further shows the difference that victories in court
can make, marginalizing some activists and putting others in
positions of power.
This Part explores the larger context of antiabortion
identity struggles, recovering these historical battles about the
meaning of a right to life and its relationship to sex, family,
and welfare rights. It begins by unearthing New Dealers’
arguments about a right to life involving a guaranteed
standard of living. Next, the Part studies the transformation of
the right to life in battles about professional identity and
lawyering during the Cold War. Finally, it chronicles the
reappearance of a right to life in the agenda of the welfare
rights movement. These different visions of a right to life
divided the antiabortion movement, as activists championed
opposing ideas about what their movement meant and which
legal goals they should pursue.
A. The New Deal Prompts Debate About the Right to Life
Abortion opponents did not pioneer the idea of a right to
such as some critical legal studies (CLS) scholars, asserted that rights reinforced
existing power structures. See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM
UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW (1987); Kristin Bumiller, Victims in
the Shadow of the Law: A Critique of the Model of Legal Protection, 12 SIGNS 421
(1987); Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through
Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN.
L. REV. 1049 (1978). Postmodern critics argue that rights-based protections are
unstable and indeterminate. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEX.
L. REV. 1363 (1984).
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life. Instead, in opposing efforts to change the laws on abortion,
activists have drawn on a rich and contradictory rhetorical
tradition entirely outside of the abortion debate. The idea of a
right to life has figured centrally in battles about human rights
law, the welfare state, and the Cold War. Since the Declaration
of Independence proclaimed “a right to life, liberty, and
happiness,”8 a variety of lawmakers, attorneys, and activists
have framed their causes in reference to a right to life.9
During the 1930s, as the Supreme Court struck down core
New Deal legislation, social workers, administrators, and legal
commentators turned to a right to life in offering a
constitutional argument for a larger social safety net. During
the 1932–1937 terms, the Supreme Court’s “Four Horsemen of
the Apocalypse”—Justices Pierce Butler, James Clark
McReynolds, George Sutherland, and Willis Van Devanter—
won enough votes to strike down the Agricultural Adjustment
Act of 1933 and the National Industrial Recovery Act, as well
as minimum wage laws and regulations of the coal industry.10
These decisions relied on a robust understanding of
constitutional rights to property and contract.11 For example,
in 1934, in Nebbia v. New York, a case involving the
constitutionality of a New York law regulating the price of
milk, the majority acknowledged that “neither property rights
nor contract rights are absolute.”12 Nonetheless, led by the
Four Horsemen, the Court insisted that “[u]nder our form of
government, the use of property and the making of contracts
are normally matters of private and not of public concern.”13
Framing the right to life as protection of an individual’s
power to make a living, advocates of the New Deal responded
that a broader social safety net would protect individual rights
8. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776).
9. See infra Part I.
10. See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936) (deciding the Agricultural
Adjustment Act); Schechter Poultry v. New York, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (deciding
the National Industrial Recovery Act). On the influence and views of the “Four
Horseman,” see BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE
STRUCTURE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 20–24, 93–101 (1998); G. EDWARD
WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL 284–301 (2000); WILLIAM E.
LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN
THE TIME OF ROOSEVELT 2, 36–43, 133–36, 155 (1995).
11. See CUSHMAN, supra note 10, at 12, 14, 77, 133–34.
12. 291 U.S. 502, 523 (1934).
13. Id.
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rather than undermine them. These administrators, activists,
and attorneys turned to the right to life in advancing their
claims,14 arguing that it implied the power to make a living.15
New Dealers argued that with the dramatic growth of the
government and the increasing complexity of the economy, the
State could not guarantee the right to life merely by leaving
individuals alone.16 For that right to have any meaning, as
advocates argued, the State had to act affirmatively to ensure
that Americans could provide for their own basic needs.17
Writing the same year that Nebbia was decided, Aubrey
Williams, an assistant administrator for the Federal
Emergency Relief Administration, insisted that to protect the
right to life, the State would have to provide some measure of
economic security.18 As the government expanded and the
economy grew more and more complex, Americans could no
longer guarantee themselves a living through “character and
industry.”19 Williams argued that in spite of social, economic,
and political changes, “[t]he right to life supposedly still means
the right to security of existence.”20 The New Deal State, in
Williams’s view, did not stand in any tension with the
Constitution. Instead, by creating welfare rights, the
government would finally “take seriously a few of our
forefathers’ principles.”21
Williams’s argument—that the right to life guaranteed
economic security—became a core justification for the New
Deal order. During his time as governor of New York, Franklin
Delano Roosevelt defended state economic intervention by
proclaiming that “every man has a right to life, and this means
14. See Aubrey Williams, Standards of Living and Government Responsibility,
176 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 37, 38–39 (1934); Students Asked to Back
NRA Drive, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 1933, at 3. New Dealers also presented access to
healthcare as one facet of a right to life. See S. J. Woolf, Right to Life, Liberty, and
Health, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1937, at 137 (quoting Dr. Thomas Parran of the
American Public Health Association framing access to healthcare as part of a
right to live). For more on the link between economic security and a right to live,
see Dr. Berle Praises Aims of New Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 1933, at 2.
15. See Williams, supra note 14, at 38–39
16. See id.; John A Ryan, President Roosevelt’s Economic Program, 23 IRISH
Q. REV. 194, 199 (1933).
17. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
18. See Williams, supra note 14, at 38–39.
19. Id. at 38.
20. Id. at 39.
21. Id.

ZIEGLER_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

6/19/2015 10:09 AM

IDENTITY CONTESTS

1281

that he also has a right to make a comfortable living.”22 Grover
Whalen, the chairman of the New York City Emergency ReEmployment Committee, rallied support for the National
Recovery Act, insisting: “[T]here can be no successful criticism
of a new system which primarily champions constitutional
rights and . . . the very right to exist.”23 By 1944, thenPresident Franklin Delano Roosevelt announced a Second Bill
of Rights connecting “rights to life and liberty” to “new goals of
human happiness and well-being.”24 As Roosevelt explained:
“[T]rue individual freedom cannot exist without economic
security and independence.”25 However, the apparent success of
those using a right to life in support of a guaranteed standard
of living was short-lived. As this Article shows next, the Cold
War and the social changes it produced moved the rhetoric of a
right to life in a decidedly conservative direction.
B. The Right to Life Changes in the Crucible of Cold War
Politics
In the aftermath of World War II and the shadow of the
Cold War, the international community embraced an expansive
understanding of the right to life that was reminiscent of the
one championed by New Dealers. However, at home, attorneys
and politicians made right-to-life rhetoric central to a defense
of American supremacy, one rooted in the superiority of
Christianity and the traditional family.
Internationally, at the start of the Nuremberg Trials in
November 1945, human rights proponents faced criticism for
22. See Ryan, supra note 16, at 199.
23. Students Asked to Back NRA Drive, supra note 14, at 3.
24. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, State of the Union Address (Jan. 11,
1944), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16518, archived at
http://perma.cc/8Y4N-984V. For more on the right to life articulated by political
leaders during the New Deal, see PAUL D. MORENO, THE AMERICAN STATE FROM
THE CIVIL WAR TO THE NEW DEAL: THE TWILIGHT OF CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
THE TRIUMPH OF PROGRESSIVISM 225–26 (2013); William E. Forbath, Caste, Class,
and Equal Citizenship, in MORAL PROBLEMS IN AMERICAN LIFE: NEW
PERSPECTIVES ON CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 186–88 (Karen Halttunen & Lewis
Perry eds., 1998); WENDY WALL, INVENTING THE AMERICAN WAY: THE POLITICS
OF CONSENSUS FROM THE NEW DEAL TO THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 212 (2008).
Ironically, the early right-to-work movement would draw on the idea of a right to
life in attacking the New Deal. See SOPHIA Z. LEE, THE WORKPLACE
CONSTITUTION FROM THE NEW DEAL TO THE NEW RIGHT 72 (2014).
25. See Roosevelt, supra note 24.
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punishing Nazi leaders for acts not formally criminalized at the
time of their commission.26 International law scholars and
policy makers responded by articulating previously implicit
rights, among them, the right to life.27 In the human rights
context, such a right covered protections from torture, murder,
and forced sterilization. For example, a 1945 draft declaration
of the International Rights and Duties of Man set forth a “right
to life from the moment of conception . . . [that] includes the
right to sustenance and support in the case of those unable to
support themselves.”28 The UN Declaration on Human Rights
would also include a right to life.29
At the start of the Cold War, leaders of the American Bar
Association (ABA) transformed this rhetoric, expressing
skepticism about internationalism, and using the right to life
as the symbol of American commitment to Christianity, small
government, and the traditional family.30 As the Soviet Union
expanded to include much of Eastern Europe, leading
American attorneys sought to differentiate their own
understandings of law and the legal profession. This vision of
the right to life formed part of an American constitutional
tradition centered on the importance of faith, small
government, and the traditional family. In a 1947 speech, Chief

26. For discussion of the due process concerns surrounding the Nuremberg
trials, see NORBERT EHRENFREUND, THE NUREMBERG LEGACY: HOW THE NAZI
WAR CRIMES TRIAL CHANGED THE COURSE OF HISTORY 201–204 (2007); CHARLES
ANTHONY SMITH, THE RISE AND FALL OF WAR CRIMES TRIALS: FROM CHARLES I TO
BUSH II 113 (2012).
27. See American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man,
OEA/Ser.L.V.II.23, doc. 21, rev. 6 (1948); Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter
Universal Declaration].
28. See Draft Declaration of the International Rights and Duties of Man,
WORLD AFF., 1945, at 200. In 1948, the final version of the declaration still
mentioned a right to life, but modified references to conception that might have
conflicted with laws on either abortion or the death penalty. See, e.g., The Baby
Boy Case, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN LAW: TREATIES,
CASES, AND ANALYSIS 329 (Francisco Forrest Martin et al. eds., 2006).
29. See Universal Declaration, supra note 27, at Art. 3. For contemporary
discussion of the right to life in the context of human rights, see “Right to Life”
Added to Planned U.N. Pact, N. Y. TIMES, May 28, 1952, at 9.
30. See Human Rights: Not So Simple, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1956, at 32 (“In
principle, we go along with any sincere declaration of human rights. . . . The
Communists agreed to these lofty ideas too—with what spectacular hypocrisy the
record shows.”); Eisenhower Urges Parley on Welfare, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 1949, at
1.

ZIEGLER_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

6/19/2015 10:09 AM

IDENTITY CONTESTS

1283

Justice Vinson laid out his ideas for the future of the bar,
explaining:
I believe in America: in her high destiny under God to stand
before the people of this earth as a shining example of
unselfish devotion to . . . the Christian ideal of liberty in
harmonious unity, built of respect for God’s image in man
and every man’s life, liberty, and happiness.31

Chief Justice Vinson connected the right to life not to a
guaranteed means of subsistence but to the superiority of
American constitutionalism. The right to life stood for the
virtues of the nuclear family, freedom from the State, and
belief in God.
Rather than expanding the protections guaranteed by the
Constitution to include the poor, this iteration of the right to
life reflected a narrow, existing tradition that distinguished
democracy from communism. The ABA-led effort to redefine
lawyers’ professional identity—one that would rely increasingly
on the idea of a right to life—offers one powerful example of the
campaign to protect American values from communist
influence. In 1947, Attorney General (and future Supreme
Court Justice) Tom C. Clark warned of a communist plot to
infiltrate the bar, led by those who would “[use] every device in
the legal category to further the interests of those who would
destroy our government.”32 ABA leaders immersed themselves
in Cold War politics, pitting the ABA against other attorneys.33
Between 1948 and 1949, the ABA voted to expel all communist
members and to support the activities of the House UnAmerican Activities Committee (HUAC).34
Efforts to counter subversive lawyering reflected a deeper
fear of the growing power of government. In distinguishing

31. See Age of Great Challenge: Chief Justice Vinson Tells Its Dangers and
Needs, 33 A.B.A. J. 1084, 1086 (1947).
32. Tom C. Clark, Civil Rights: The Boundless Responsibility of Lawyers, 32
A.B.A. J. 453, 456–57 (1947).
33. On ABA politics during the Cold War, see JEROLD S. AUERBACH,
UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA 231–38,
246–48 (1976); JAMES E. MOLITERNO, THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION IN
CRISIS: RESISTANCE AND RESPONSES TO CHANGE 56–69 (2013).
34. See Communists and Communism: Association Votes in Support of the
Mundt-Nixon Bill, 34 A.B.A. J. 899 (1948).
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democracy from communism, ABA advocates turned to the
right to life, presenting it as a uniquely American ideal
connected to the virtues of small government. Right-to-life
arguments played an especially crucial role in the conflict
between the ABA and the National Lawyers Guild (NLG) in
the early 1950s.35 Unlike the ABA, the NLG did not bar
communists from joining, and the group attracted not only
those with socialist or communist leanings but also civil-rights
activists and civil libertarians.36 In the 1950s, the NLG
championed a robust understanding of the First Amendment,
but the group’s main push involved federally subsidized legal
services for the poor.37 In 1949, encouraged by a report issued
by the Rushcliffe Committee in England, a Guild committee
described privately funded legal aid as “mere charitable
indulgence.”38 By contrast, as the NLG viewed it, Americans
had a right to an attorney, and legal assistance represented a
“categorical constitutional imperative.”39
The ABA rejected this proposal as the “socialization” of the
law40—in the words of Judge Richard Hartshorne, it
represented a “threat to the independence of the profession.”41
While insinuating that the NLG was the “legal bulwark of the
Communist Party,” ABA lawyers developed a broader attack on
expansive government power. In particular, ABA leaders
argued that as the State expanded, individuals’ constitutional
rights came under fire. “Such governments,” wrote Judge
Robert N. Wilkin, “take property without compensation, and

35. On the conflict between the ABA and the NLG during the Cold War, see
AUERBACH, supra note 33, at 200–36; MOLITERNO, supra note 33, at 59–60.
36. NAACP attorney and future Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Marshall—
a strong opponent of communism—served on the NLG Board prior to 1949. See
Ernesto Longo, A History of America’s First Jim Crow Law School Library and
Staff, 7 CONN. PUB. INT. L. J. 77, 94 (2007) (“Beginning in 1939, black lawyers
were elected to the Guild’s national board, and in 1943, Charles Houston and
Thurgood Marshall, among others, became associate editors of the Lawyer’s
Guild Review.”). On the NLG’s ties to civil rights and civil liberties activism, see
MOLITERNO, supra note 33, at 59–61.
37. See AUERBACH, supra note 33, at 236.
38. Id.
39. See id.
40. Robert Storey, The Legal Profession Versus Regimentation: A Program to
Counter Socialization, 37 A.B.A. J. 100, 100 (1951).
41. Richard Hartshorne, The Bar and the Indigent Criminal Defendant, 37
A.B.A. J. 104, 104 (1951).
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life without even a trial.”42
In opposition to socialized government, ABA leaders
articulated a uniquely American constitutional tradition—one
that rejected the “regimentation” and socialism supposedly
peddled by the NLG. American constitutionalism required
respect for individualism, Christianity, and the patriarchal
family.43 In 1950, ABA President Harold J. Gallagher argued:
The Soviet Union and its satellite states stand for the
principle that the state is all powerful, that men are its
mere servants. This is an atheistic concept. It ignores the
human and divine dignity of man. It is a denial of the
traditional concepts of the Declaration of Independence
made effective in our Constitution.44

Praising small government and voicing concerns about
expansive federal power, ABA attorneys distanced themselves
from the New Deal order and from early demands for poverty
rights, framing the right to life as part of a constitutional
regime based on tradition, history, and protection of the
nuclear family.
Despite the advances made by the ABA, struggles about
the meaning of the right to life were far from over. Though
attrition had almost destroyed the NLG, leaving the
organization with only 600 members in 1956, a more expansive
definition of the right to life reemerged at the outset of the War
on Poverty.45 The next section will explore how arguments
about the right to life focused again on guarantees of
government support.

42. Robert N. Wilkin, What Are We Fighting For? The Need for Juridical
Order, 37 A.B.A. J. 1, 1 (1951).
43. On the connection between anticommunism and commitment to
Christianity, small government, and the traditional family, see DONALD T.
CRITCHLOW, PHYLLIS SCHLAFLY AND GRASSROOTS CONSERVATISM: A WOMAN’S
CRUSADE 76 (2005); DANIEL FARBER, THE RISE AND FALL OF MODERN AMERICAN
CONSERVATISM 110, 121–22 (2010).
44. Howard J. Gallagher, Our Basic Freedoms: The President’s Independence
Day Address, 36 A.B.A. J. 731, 731 (1950). For similar arguments of this kind, see
Bill of Rights Day Celebrated Here, N. Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1948, at 32.
45. See GUENTER LEWY, THE CAUSE THAT FAILED: COMMUNISM IN AMERICAN
POLITICAL LIFE 284–85 (1990).
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C. During the War on Poverty, Right-to-Life Arguments
Gain Momentum
In the 1960s and 1970s, as poverty lawyers brought their
cases to the courts, right-to-life arguments became more
expansive, sparking demands for new entitlements and welfare
rights. Claims of this kind appeared as early as the 1950s. The
author of a book on the right to life,46 A. Delafield Smith, an
attorney at the Office of General Counsel of the Federal
Security Agency, contended in the late 1950s that social,
political, and economic changes had made it necessary for the
government to ensure an individual’s right to make a living.47
“The time must come,” Smith explained, “when the declaration
and implementation of a right to assistance . . . will lead to the
enactment of a permanent self-operative system.”48 With the
mobilization of welfare-rights advocates, arguments like
Smith’s became a centerpiece of movement advocacy. Poverty
lawyers and grassroots activists began arguing inside and
outside of court that the right to life guaranteed a minimum
standard of economic security.
Members of the civil rights movement built on
longstanding concerns about the intersection of poverty and
discrimination, leveraging resources created by the War on
Poverty.49 Prior to the 1960s, Legal Aid Societies had enjoyed a
virtual monopoly in poverty law services.50 With new federal
funding available for legal services for the poor, the number of
poverty lawyers skyrocketed, climbing over 650 percent to

46. See generally A. DELAFIELD SMITH, THE RIGHT TO LIFE (1957).
47. See A. Delafield Smith, Public Assistance as a Social Obligation, 63 HARV.
L. REV. 266, 288 (1949).
48. Id. Economist Alvin Hansen similarly argued that “[b]y and large the
right to establish a business or to acquire free land and was adequate, in the
nineteenth century, . . . to ensure the ‘right to life, liberty, and happiness.’ This is
no longer the case.” ALVIN H. HANSEN, ECONOMIC POLICY AND FULL EMPLOYMENT
15–16 (1947).
49. See FELICIA KORNBLUH, THE BATTLE FOR WELFARE RIGHTS: POVERTY AND
POLITICS IN MODERN AMERICA 69 (2007) (“The map of legal resources available to
welfare recipients changed dramatically in the middle1960s.”).
50. See MARTHA F. DAVIS, BRUTAL NEED: LAWYERS AND THE WELFARE
RIGHTS MOVEMENT, 1965–1973 11 (1993).
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2,500 in 1971.51
With the advent of the War on Poverty and increased
federal funding, lawyers and activists used right-to-life rhetoric
to demand basic necessities, welfare payments, and even access
to credit. New organizations formed to advance this agenda,
including law professor Edward V. Sparer’s Center for Social
Welfare Policy and Law, a group committed not only to
providing the poor with access to routine legal services but also
to guaranteeing a right to financial support.52 Like Smith,
Sparer asserted that the Constitution protected a right to
live—shorthand for access to basic necessities.53 As poverty law
flourished, grassroots activists and lawyers picked up on
Sparer’s argument. Charles Rachlin and the legal office of the
Congress for Racial Equality (CORE) began helping New York
welfare recipients bring hearings to protect their rights.54 Led
by former CORE member George Wiley, the National Welfare
Rights Organization (NWRO) also used the right to life in
demanding access to credit.55
Similar rhetorical arguments soon shaped litigation in the
Supreme Court. In 1968, in King v. Smith, attorney Martin
Garbus challenged an Alabama statute denying payments
under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)
program to any woman in an extramarital sexual
relationship.56 The Court did not directly mention a right to life
but struck down the Alabama statute, holding that federal law
preempted it.57 Interviewed by the New York Times following
his victory, Garbus celebrated the demise of a law that
deprived “helpless children” of their “right to life”—the AFDC
payments on which so many families depended.58 In the wake
of Smith, the 1968 ACLU Biennial Conference passed a
51. Id. at 10.
52. Id. at 81–82.
53. See id. For Sparer’s writings on the subject, see Edward V. Sparer, The
New Legal Aid as an Instrument of Social Change, 1965 U. ILL. L. F. 57 (1965);
Edward V. Sparer, The Right to Welfare, in THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS: WHAT
THEY ARE, WHAT THEY SHOULD BE 65 (Norman Dorsen ed., 1971).
54. See, e.g., KORNBLUH, supra note 49, at 71; DAVIS, supra note 50, at 76, 92.
55. On the NWRO and the right to live, see KORNBLUH, supra note 49, at 126.
56. 392 U.S. 309, 314 (1968). The State deemed any man a woman was
involved with outside of marriage a “substitute father.” Id. at 311.
57. Id. at 326–27, 334.
58. Walter Goodman, The Case of Mrs. Sylvester Smith: A Victory for 400,000
Children, N. Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 1968, at 62.
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resolution stating that “income should be provided and
guaranteed as a matter of right,” and those present almost
universally agreed “that constitutional justifications could be
advanced for the theory of entitlement; [including] the right to
life.”59
The idea of a right to life spread from movement
organizations to the academy. Sparer traveled around the
country lecturing on a right to life that would “protect the
rights of the powerless, the weak, and the dispossessed.”60 In
1969, ACLU leader and New York University law professor
Norman Dorsen told the New York Times that Sparer’s
constitutional arguments “were sound legally as well as just in
principle.”61 Charles Reich published a path-breaking article in
the Yale Law Journal on the “new property,” arguing that the
poor sometimes had protectable interests in welfare payments
and other forms of state support.62 The work of scholars like
Frank Michelman elaborated on a constitutional framework for
welfare rights.63
Encouraged by the outcome in King and the flourishing of
scholarship supporting their cause, poverty lawyers believed
that a series of Supreme Court decisions in the 1960s signaled
the justices’ willingness to later recognize a substantive right
to life. The Court’s use of right-to-life rhetoric began in 1969,
with Shapiro v. Thompson.64 There, Vivian Thompson, a
nineteen-year-old single mother, applied for AFDC support
after moving to Hartford, Connecticut, to live with her
59. ACLU 1968 Biennial Conference, “Report on Workshop on Entitlement to
Government Benefits” (June 20–25, 1968), in The ACLU Papers, Box 111, Folder
9, Department of Special Collections and Rare Books, Mudd Library, Princeton
University.
60. Israel Shenker, Guarantee of “Right to Live” Is Urged, N. Y. TIMES, Sept.
28, 1969, at 40.
61. Id.
62. See generally Charles Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964);
see also Charles Reich, The Law of the Planned Society, 75 YALE L.J. 1227, 1265
(1966).
63. See Frank Michelman, Foreword: The Supreme Court 1968 Term—On
Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7, 11–
13 (1969); Frank Michelman, In Pursuit of Constitutional Welfare Rights: One
View of Rawls’ Theory of Justice, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 962, 966–67 (1973). For
similar arguments involving a right to live, see Bernard E. Harvith, Federal
Equal Protection and Welfare Assistance, 31 ALB. L. REV. 210, 241–45 (1967).
64. 394 U.S. 618 (1969), overruled in part by Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651
(1974).
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mother.65 Relying on a residency-requirement law, the State
denied Thompson’s request since she had not resided in state
for a year at the time of her application.66 The Supreme Court
struck down the law, holding that it unconstitutionally
burdened Thompson’s right to travel.67 In dicta, the Court
emphasized the importance of welfare aid, “upon which may
depend the ability of the families to obtain the very means to
subsist—food, shelter, and other necessities of life.”68 In 1970,
the Court also handed down Goldberg v. Kelly, holding that
welfare recipients were entitled to a hearing before the
termination of benefits.69
Although the Court had not recognized a substantive right
to life, poverty lawyers and activists were energized by their
victories in Shapiro and Goldberg and continued to push for
explicit recognition of the right to life. They next challenged a
Maryland maximum-grant statute that capped the AFDC
payment available to a family regardless of how many children
required support in Dandridge v. Williams.70 The Dandridge
attorneys contended that the maximum-grant law interfered
with the appellees’ right to life:
Fundamental rights include those rights basic to survival
and well-being whether or not they are specifically
expressed in the Constitution. Certainly, in any hierarchy of
rights the right to bare necessities of life and minimal
physical well-being ranks as high as the right to procreate,
privacy, vote, marry or travel. Indeed, as mentioned
previously, these rights presuppose the existence of a basic
right to life and are dependent upon such a right to life.71

To the surprise of the Dandridge attorneys, the Court’s
decision in the case marked the beginning of a series of defeats
that dashed some of the hopes created by Shapiro and
Goldberg. The Dandridge Court held that the maximum-grant
65. Id. at 623–24.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 633–42
68. Id. at 627.
69. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
70. 397 U.S. 471, 474–75 (1970).
71. Brief for Appellees at *44, Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1969)
(No. 131) 1969 WL 119896 (citations omitted).
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law neither conflicted with the federal Social Security Act nor
violated the Equal Protection Clause, implying that future
challenges to welfare laws would fail so long as “the State’s
action [was] rationally based and free from invidious
discrimination.”72 Continuing this trend, in 1971, in Wyman v.
James, the Court agreed that states could terminate welfare
benefits if a recipient denied a caseworker access to her
home.73 In 1973, in New York State Department of Social
Services v. Dublino, the Court upheld a work requirement more
demanding than the one set forth in federal law.74
Nonetheless, for a variety of welfare rights activists and
civil libertarians, the right to life remained a cornerstone of
demands for a better standard of living for the poor. In the
1970s, in seeking access to consumer credit, members of the
NWRO argued that the Constitution guaranteed Americans’
basic needs.75 A divided ACLU revisited the issue of a right to
life at its 1972 Biennial Conference. Those in favor of
advocating for economic rights argued that existing ACLU
policies “add[ed] up to the right to an adequate standard of
living.”76 Another member agreed that “[e]qual protection
requires the elimination of poverty.”77 Others objected,
stressing that the pursuit of a right to life would be tactically
counterproductive and intellectually dishonest.78 Ultimately,
the organization voted to continue backing rights to economic
security.79
Before the start of the abortion wars, right-to-life rhetoric
remained a prominent feature of American constitutional
discourse. Progressives, poverty rights lawyers, and New
Dealers used the right to life to demand new protections for the
poor. Anticommunists, conservatives, and members of the ABA
drew on the right to life in offering their own vision of the
Constitution, one focused on the importance of God and the
72. 397 U.S. at 487.
73. 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
74. 413 U.S. 405 (1973).
75. See KORNBLUH, supra note 49, at 126. For discussion of the NWRO’s
understanding of basic needs, see id. at 60; DAVIS, supra note 50, at 40–43.
76. ACLU, 1972 Biennial Conference Unedited Report: Economic Rights
(June 10, 1972) (on file with The ACLU Papers, Box 111, Folder 9, Department of
Special Collections and Rare Books, Mudd Library, Princeton University).
77. Id.
78. See id.
79. See id.
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traditional family. Conflicts about the meaning of a right to life
revealed deep social and political schisms along the lines of
class, race, and ideology. The same fissures would plague the
early antiabortion movement. As the next Part shows, the
disagreements about the size and role of government that
animated earlier fights about the right to life created a fault
line in the antiabortion movement, dividing those who
identified their cause with the political Right from those
committed to a more responsive welfare state.
II. THE CREATION OF AN ANTIABORTION RIGHT TO LIFE
Social-movement struggles over identity—like the one that
rocked the antiabortion movement—have profound stakes for
groups seeking social change. Creating an identity often proves
crucial for movement mobilization, empowering individual
activists, and convincing them that their cause is worth
pursuing.80 Perhaps more importantly, movement identity
helps to determine the recruits a movement will attract, the
legal goals recruits can pursue, and the coalitions they can
forge. As social movement scholars Doug McAdam and Debra
Friedman argue, a movement’s collective identity “will, in large
part, determine both the number and kind of people who are
likely to be attracted.”81
In the mid-1960s, when states began to repeal or reform
existing laws on abortion, those who would form the
antiabortion movement fought intensely about how to define
themselves, drawing on competing ideas about the right to life.
These activists were predominantly white and Catholic, but the
movement and its leadership included Americans with a
variety of political beliefs and socioeconomic backgrounds,
including Protestants, Jews, and other believers and non80. See Todd Schroer, Technical Advances in Communication: The Example of
White Racialist “Love Groups” and White Civil Rights Organizations, in IDENTITY
WORK IN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 79 (Jo Reger et al. eds., 2008); see also Jane Jensen,
What’s in a Name? National Movements and Public Discourse, in SOCIAL
MOVEMENTS AND CULTURE 107–26 (Hank Johnson et al. eds., 1995); Verta Taylor
& Nancy Whittier, Collective Identity in Social Movement Communities: Lesbian
Feminist Mobilizations, in FRONTIERS IN SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY 104-130
(Aldon Morris et al. eds., 1994).
81. Doug McAdam & Debra Friedman, Collective Identity and Activism:
Networks, Choices, and The Life of a Social Movement, in FRONTIERS IN SOCIAL
MOVEMENT THEORY 156–73 (Aldon Morris et al. eds., 1994).
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believers.82
While agreeing that rights for the unborn child belonged to
a longstanding constitutional tradition, movement members
interpreted the constitutional right to life in very different
ways, reflecting conflicting ideas about the size of government
and the justice of the economic and legal status quo. In
examining these understudied conflicts, section A focuses on
activists who saw legal abortion as part of a broader attack on
everything that made America unique, particularly traditional
sexual mores and family values. Echoing the right-to-life
rhetoric that had defined anticommunism, these abortion
opponents condemned what they saw as a wave of selfishness
that would undermine the family and the moral norms that
had made the nation great. By contrast, section B illuminates
the efforts of those who described the right to life as part of a
broader protectionist, welfare agenda. These activists lobbied
for laws protecting women, children, and the poor from both
discrimination and financial insecurity.
This Part shows that disagreements about the meaning of
the right to life created a larger rift in the antiabortion
movement, as activists fought about how to link the abortion
issue to other causes. Litigation—and victory in court—would
change the course of internal battles dramatically. Seduced by
the possibility of immediate success, movement members
transformed their cause.
A. The Right to Life as a War against the Sexual
Revolution
When states began reforming their abortion laws, some
critics predicted that any change would unleash a wave of
sexual promiscuity.83 Arguments about illicit sex reflected a
worldview that was centered on opposition to contraception,
homosexuality, and the sexual revolution. While often citing
82. On the diversity of the movement see ZIAD MUNSON, THE MAKING OF PROLIFE ACTIVISTS: HOW SOCIAL MOVEMENT MOBILIZATION WORKS 192 (2008); Keith
Cassidy, The Right to Life Movement: Sources, Development, and Strategies, in
THE POLITICS OF ABORTION AND BIRTH CONTROL IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
(Donald T. Critchlow ed., 1996).
83. See Frank Ayd, Jr., Liberal Abortion Laws, AMERICA, Feb. 1, 1969, at
130–32; CHARLES RICE, THE VANISHING RIGHT TO LIVE: AN APPEAL FOR A
RENEWED REVERENCE FOR LIFE 125, 134 (1969).
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Catholic doctrine, these activists echoed earlier understandings
of the right to life, particularly anticommunist arguments
about what sets Americans apart. According to these activists,
a commitment to marriage, to the nuclear family, and to
heterosexuality defined American constitutional tradition.
Abortion threatened that tradition by nurturing a culture of
selfishness, individualism, sexual experimentation, and
pleasure-seeking.
Theo Stearns, a former hippie and the founder of Catholics
United for Life, a group that picketed California abortion
clinics, saw a connection between contraception and abortion
because both involved “materialism and a mechanization of
sex.”84 Charles Rice, an activist and law professor at Fordham
and later Notre Dame, also argued that defending the right to
life meant battling tolerance of homosexuality and birth
control.85 Rice condemned not only abortion but also “the
philosophy of unrestraint” and “pursuit of pleasure” that he
thought had torn the nation apart.86 He argued that Americans
should oppose abortion “not because it is sinful, according to
the edict of any particular religion, but because it poses a clear
and present danger to the endurance of the family as the basic
unit of society.”87
In seeking to protect the traditional family, some
movement members identified a causal connection between the
pursuit of pleasure, contraception, and abortion. Father Paul
Marx, the founder of the antiabortion group Human Life
International, explained this “contraceptive mentality” thesis
as follows: “[T]he resolve to prevent a child from coming to be is
often sufficiently strong that one will eliminate the child whose
conception is not prevented.”88
Others pinpointed what they saw as a cultural decline tied
to the sexual revolution. Abortion opponent Dennis Caddy
explained: “What we once termed ‘selfishness’ is now known as
‘self-actualization,’
‘self-fulfillment,’
or
some
other
euphemism.”89 Noted antiabortion scholar John Noonan
84. MICHAEL W. CUNEO, THE SMOKE OF SATAN: CONSERVATIVE AND
TRADITIONALIST DISSENT IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN CATHOLICISM 64 (1999).
85. See generally RICE, supra note 83, at 125, 134.
86. Id. at 125.
87. Id. at 134.
88. CUNEO, supra note 84, at 62.
89. Dennis L. Caddy, Is Self-Actualization Actually Selfishness?, NAT’L PRO-
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similarly argued that Americans had pursued legal abortion
“because they wanted freedom, particularly sexual freedom.”90
Noonan explicitly tied the rise of abortion rights to changing
gender roles, asserting that the momentum of the opposition
grew because of “antagonism between the sexes.”91 The Society
for a Christian Commonwealth (SCC), an absolutist group,
summarized this understanding of the cause: “The SCC is
dedicated to convincing all Americans that the attack on life in
whatever form—birth control, abortion, euthanasia, genetic
manipulation, denigration of sex—is wrong.”92
Certainly, these hardliners drew on Catholic religious
teachings about sex and contraception, and the hierarchy of the
Catholic Church played a defining role in organizing and
supporting antiabortion groups.93 Nonetheless, hardliners’
understanding of the antiabortion cause offered a deeper attack
on shifting sexual mores and gender norms—one grounded in
earlier anticommunist and pro-family rhetoric. The SCC’s
flagship publication, Triumph, contended: “The Soviet Union is
a formally atheistic country, and while some Americans have
taken comfort in the difference, they should not.”94
Activists in organizations like the SCC reaffirmed that the
right to life and all it represented played a crucial role in
distinguishing democracy from communism. By extension,
when women “assert[ed] the power to control and manipulate
human life,” women destroyed everything that made American
LIFE J. (1979), at 14, in The National Pro-Life Journal Folder, The Wilcox
Collection, University of Kansas.
90. John Noonan, Jr., Abortion in Our Culture, NAT’L PRO-LIFE J. (1979), at
10–11 (on file with The National Pro-Life Journal Folder, The Wilcox Collection,
University of Kansas).
91. Id.
92. SOCIETY FOR A CHRISTIAN COMMONWEALTH, PAMPHLET, “TOWARD A
CHRISTIAN AMERICA: 1970, 1971 (n. d.) (on file with The Society for a Christian
Commonwealth Folder, The Wilcox Collection, University of Kansas).
93. Bozell’s SCC relied on a then-marginalized millenialist vision of
Catholicism. See CAROL MASON, KILLING FOR LIFE: THE APOCALYPTIC NARRATIVE
OF PRO-LIFE POLITICS 139 (2002). Other hardliners echoed the idea of a
contraceptive mentality formulated by Pope John Paul II. See CUNEO, supra note
84, at 278–80. For discussion of Pope John Paul II’s vision of a contraceptive
mentality, see Arland K, Nichols, Abortion and the Contraceptive Mentality,
CRISIS MAG., Jan. 21, 2013, available at http://www.crisismagazine.com/2013/
abortion-and-the-contraceptive-mentality, archived at http://perma.cc/J9AQPJ6W.
94. MASON, supra note 93, at 142 (quoting Brent Bozell, The Confessional
Tribe, TRIUMPH, July 1970, at 11–15).
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democracy better than communism.95 As one attorney wrote in
1963, these movement members connected abortion to “[t]he
[in]stability of the marriage bond, . . . the corruption of youth,
[and] the spread of sexual promiscuity.”96 Opposing abortion
meant recognizing that “the state can, should, and does in fact
legislate in the field of public morality.”97
To advance their vision, activists formed their own
organizations, including Brent Bozell’s Society for a Christian
Commonwealth, Randy Engel’s United States Coalition for
Life, and Theo Stearns’ Catholics United for Life.98 At other
times, activists like Rice, Engel, and Bozell fought to set the
agenda for larger, more influential groups like Americans
United for Life and the National Right to Life Committee.99
However, within organizations like the National Right to Life
Committee and Americans United for Life, hardliners met
resistance from advocates who voiced a very different vision of
the right to life. Whether working on their own or in larger
groups, as Section B shows, hardliners clashed with activists
who understood the right to life—and the role of government in
redistributing wealth—in very different terms.
B. The Right to Life as Protection for the Vulnerable and
the Dependent
A second faction created a different right-to-life discourse,
one that resembled New Deal arguments about economic
security and protection of the vulnerable. Writing in 1972,
Catholic feminist Sidney Callahan condemned abortion but
endorsed broader support for the vulnerable, contending that
“[t]he whole society has a responsibility for the next
generation,” regardless of how “immature, helpless, or different
95. Id.
96. William J. Kenealy, Law and Morals, 9 CATH. LAW 200, 204 (1963).
97. Id.
98. On the Society for a Christian Commonwealth, see MASON, supra note 93,
at 140–49; MARK D. POPOWSKI, THE RISE AND FALL OF TRIUMPH: THE HISTORY OF
A RADICAL ROMAN CATHOLIC MAGAZINE, 1966–1976 104, 126, 139, 214–16 (2012).
For the USCL’s account of its own history, see Early History, U.S. COALITION FOR
LIFE, http://www.uscl.info/index.php?pr=History (last visited Jan. 25, 2014),
archived at http://perma.cc/6BT3-5C9X. On Catholics United For Life, see CUNEO,
supra note 84, at 64–65.
99. In chronicling battles over birth control in these organizations, Part II
later discusses conservatives’ influence over these groups.
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[a person] is from white middle class adult males who have
heretofore preempted the right to be fully human.”100
After the Supreme Court decided Roe v. Wade, activists
began insisting that the government’s failure to support the
poor and vulnerable forced some women to choose abortion. In
July 1973, at the annual National Right to Life Convention,
Senator Mark Hatfield (R-OR) told colleagues in the
antiabortion movement:
If we are to be for life, then we will be in the vanguard of
those working to ensure that no human life comes into being
ever need be threatened by abortion because of society’s
negligence to provide for the need of all its citizens. We are
the ones who must guarantee that the critical conditions of
life—for food, shelter, health, and education—are available
to every person in our society . . . .101

Some of those who shared Hatfield’s perspective drew a causal
connection between abortion and an inadequate social safety
net. They argued that women resorted to abortion only when
denied the benefits and economic security they deserved. As
Reverend Jesse Jackson, an early ally of the antiabortion
movement, explained: “Politicians argue for abortion largely
because they do not want to spend the necessary money to feed,
clothe, and educate more people.”102
These activists also believed that both unborn children and
all poor people—particularly unwed mothers—had a right to
state support. Influential Minnesota activist Fred Mecklenburg
articulated this position:
For the woman who becomes pregnant . . . , we need positive
programs of assistance in providing first-rate medical,
psychological, financial, and social assistance . . . . It is also

100. Sidney Callahan, Feminist as Antiabortionist, NAT’L CATH. REP., Apr. 7,
1972, at 11.
101. Press Release, From the Office of Senator Mark O. Hatfield (June 10,
1973), in The American Citizens Concerned for Life Papers, Box 4, National Right
to Life Convention Folder.
102. Jesse Jackson, How We Respect Life Is Over-Riding Moral Issue, NAT’L
RIGHT TO LIFE NEWS, Jan. 1977, at 5, in The National Right to Life News
Collection, 1977 Box, Dr. Joseph R. Stanton Human Life Issues Library and
Resource Center, Sisters for Life Convent, Bronx, New York.
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the only alternative which offers any possibility of success
that will still preserve the basic values of respect for life
that characterizes American democracy.103

Mecklenburg favored welfare rights both as a strategy for
reducing the need for abortion and as a necessary extension of
the right to life. Judith Fink, a founding member of the
National Right to Life Committee (NRLC) and prominent
activist, shared Mecklenburg’s perspective. She called on her
colleagues to support legislation against pregnancy
discrimination, urging abortion opponents to help “change
discriminatory insurance practices, improve supportive
services for mothers and babies, and help pregnant workers
with disability payments . . . .”104 Fink believed that such
measures would both prevent abortion and help poor women,
and she argued that such laws represented “the minimum that
must be done if we truly care about enhancing the conditions of
life [for mothers and children].”105
Not surprisingly, the very different ideas of a right to life
dividing welfare supporters from hardliners led movement
members to embrace different legal reforms and policy
objectives. Rather than working with conservative Catholics or
Protestants, Mecklenburg and her colleagues often sided with
Planned Parenthood and feminist groups in demanding
legislation that outlawed pregnancy discrimination or
guaranteed financial support for adolescent mothers.106 As
section C demonstrates next, political and legal disagreements
about contraception brought fights about the right to life to the
surface in explosive new ways.

103. Dr. Fred Mecklenburg, Minnesota Should Seek Sexual Responsibility, Not
“Easier” Abortions, in The American Citizens Concerned for Life Papers, Box 23,
Administrative File: People, General.
104. Press Release, American Citizens Concerned for Life, Pro-Life Group Says
General Electric Corp. “Encourages Abortion” in Gilbert Case; Calls for Support of
Legislation to Provide Pregnancy Disability Payments (Mar. 15, 1977), in The
American Citizens Concerned for Life Papers, Box 16, Press Releases Folder.
105. Press Release, supra note 101, at 1.
106. Mary Ziegler, Beyond Backlash: Legal History, Backlash, and Roe v.
Wade, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 969, 991–95 (2014).
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C. Battles About Contraception Expose Fissures in the
Antiabortion Movement
Clashes about birth control brought to the surface
longstanding
disagreements
about
the
antiabortion
movement’s identity. Hardliners saw access to contraception as
the reason so many Americans had sought out abortion.
Moreover, for these abortion opponents, birth control and
sexual pleasure reflected a dangerous form of selfishness that
the movement had to combat. By contrast, activists like Judy
Fink and Marjory Mecklenburg saw birth control as one
resource the government should provide for women struggling
to make a living. The battle over birth control exposed deeper
questions about movement identity, objectives, and ideology.
Should the antiabortion movement stand against the sexual
revolution, or should defending the right to life primarily
involve efforts to protect the economic security of all weak and
vulnerable Americans?
In 1972, the birth control issue impacted Americans
United for Life (AUL), the group that would become the leading
antiabortion,
public-interest
litigation
organization.107
Antiabortion activists organized the AUL to educate the public
about abortion and to signal the movement’s educational
pedigree and religious diversity.108 Hardliners like Brent Bozell
and Charles Rice played an instrumental role in the AUL’s
founding, as did ACLU member George Huntston Williams and
Marjory Mecklenburg, the wife of Fred Mecklenburg and the
Chairman of the NRLC.109 However, even hardliners split on
issues such as access to birth control and exceptional

107. See ANN SOUTHWORTH, LAWYERS OF THE RIGHT: PROFESSIONALIZING THE
CONSERVATIVE COALITION 16 (2008) (discussing the origins of the AUL’s litigation
efforts).
108. See Americans United for Life, A Declaration of Purpose (n. d.), in The
Americans United for Life Papers, Box 91, Executive File, Concordia Seminary,
Lutheran Church Missouri Synod (explaining that the organization’s purpose was
to demonstrate and draw attention to the evils of all anti-life policies);
Fundraising Letter, Americans United for Life, (Aug. 10, 1972) in The Americans
United for Life Papers, Box 91, Executive File, Concordia Seminary, Lutheran
Church Missouri Synod.
109. For a list of the early AUL leadership, see Letter from George Huntston
Williams to AUL Directors (June 19, 1972), in The Americans United for Life
Papers, Box 91, Executive File, Concordia Seminary, Lutheran Church Missouri
Synod.
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circumstance abortions.
In detailing his opposition to “abortion on demand,”
Williams wrote a book chapter arguing in favor of
contraception and sex education.110 Since Williams predicated
his opposition to abortion on a theory of sexual responsibility,
he also favored exceptions to abortion bans under certain
circumstances, including rape and incest.111
Bozell wrote a letter to sympathetic AUL members,
including Charles Rice, arguing that the group was not truly
pro-life because some members favored exceptions to abortion
bans and access to “abortifacient” contraceptives.112 Rice
shared Bozell’s anger. Dissatisfied that the AUL would not
take a strong enough stand against the pill, and angry that the
organization would not vote for a resolution opposing all
abortion without exception, he and several of his allies
resigned, while activists who favored birth control, like Marjory
Mecklenburg and Williams, gained more influence.113
The fight over birth control and movement identity spread
across movement organizations. The NRLC, the nation’s
largest organization, found itself deadlocked, split between
supporters of Catholic President Edward Golden and Marjory
Mecklenburg, a staunch supporter of birth control.114 Hardliner
Randy Engel called for Mecklenburg’s expulsion from the
group, arguing that she and her husband had called “for Uncle
Sam to come into the bedrooms of Americans and assume a
more dominant role than he already has.”115 Although
resoundingly re-elected to the NRLC Executive Committee,
Mecklenburg narrowly lost the presidential campaign to
110. See George Huntston Williams, The Sacred Condominium, in THE
MORALITY OF ABORTION 169–71 (John T. Noonan ed., 1970).
111. See id.
112. Letter from Brent Bozell to John F. Hillebrand (Mar. 3, 1972), in The
Americans United for Life Papers, Box 91, Executive File, Concordia Seminary,
Lutheran Church Missouri Synod.
113. See PATRICK ALITT, CATHOLIC INTELLECTUALS AND CONSERVATIVE
POLITICS IN AMERICA 187 (1993).
114. On the divisions between Golden and Mecklenburg, see WILLIAM P.
MALONEY, THE OWL IN THE SAGUARO: REPORT TO OFFICERS AND BOARD OF
DIRECTORS OF THE RIGHT TO LIFE COMMITTEE OF NEW MEXICO 5 (1974), in The
American Citizens Concerned for Life Papers, Box 8, 1974 NRLC Board and
Executive Committee Folder 1.
115. Letter from Randy Engel to NRLC Board of Directors (Mar. 30, 1974), in
The American Citizens Concerned for Life Papers, Box 8, 1974 NRLC Board and
Executive Committee Folder 1.
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Golden and resigned to lead an organization that better
reflected her view of the antiabortion cause.116
With activists championing radically different visions of
the movement identity, abortion law and politics remained
highly unpredictable throughout the later 1970s. Would the
antiabortion movement align with the political Right or Left?
Would activists maintain a single-issue focus? Or would
abortion opponents instead embrace one of the broader agendas
promoted by either hardliners or welfare supporters?
New absolutist organizations, like the American Life
League (ALL) and the Pro-Life Action League (PLAL), formed
to reshape the law on birth control, sex education, and the
Equal Rights Amendment.117 In 1977, Judie Brown, an
abortion opponent who went on to found the ALL, spearheaded
efforts to pass the first NRLC resolution against a
constitutional sex-equality guarantee.118 Later, Brown and her
allies pushed for Ronald Reagan’s proposal to include Title X in
a state block-grant program, allowing conservatives at the
state level to restrict or defund family planning.119 Brown and
her colleagues called on the movement to wage war on “pillpushing Planned Parenthood.”120 As she explained:
The real choice that adolescents have, who have been
brainwashed by the ‘new’ sexual value system of Planned
116. On the fight surrounding Mecklenburg’s election, see Meeting Minutes,
NRLC Board of Directors 11 (June 7–9, 1974), in The American Citizens
Concerned for Life Papers, Box 8, 1974 NRLC Board and Executive Committee
Folder 1. On Mecklenburg’s resignation and decision to join the ACCL, see Letter
from Marjory Mecklenburg to NRLC Board of Directors (Oct. 8, 1974), in The
American Citizens Concerned for Life Papers, Box 8, 1974 NRLC Board and
Executive Committee Folder 1.
117. On the formation and positions of the ALL, see Michael W. Cuneo, Life
Battles: The Rise of Catholic Militancy Within the American Pro-Life Movement, in
BEING RIGHT: CONSERVATIVE CATHOLICS IN AMERICA 280 (Mary Jo Weaver & R.
Scott Appleby eds., 1995); CUNEO, supra note 84, at 61–66. On the PLAL, see
CUNEO, supra note 84, at 67–68, 76, 78; JAMES RISEN & JUDY THOMAS, THE
WRATH OF ANGELS: THE AMERICAN ABORTION WAR 67, 111–13 (1998).
118. See Letter from Judie Brown to Recipients of First Class Mailing (Oct. 17,
1977), in The American Citizens Concerned for Life Papers, Box 11, 1977 NRLC
Folder 7.
119. On the ALL’s Title X campaign, see ROBERT O. SELF, ALL IN THE FAMILY:
THE REALIGNMENT OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY SINCE THE 1960S 381 (2012). On
the ALL’s view at the time, see The Pill and Politics, A.L.L. ABOUT NEWS, Aug.
1981, in The A.L.L. About News Folder, Wilcox Collection, University of Kansas.
120. The Pill and Politics, supra note 119.
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Parenthood and the drug industry, is a choice between the
acknowledged risks of oral contraceptives and abortion.121

Whereas absolutists like Brown called on the movement to
destroy Planned Parenthood, those who connected welfare
rights with opposition to abortion joined with family planning
supporters to push protective legislation for the poor, pregnant
women, children, and unwed mothers. Groups like Marjory
Mecklenburg’s American Citizens Concerned for Life (ACCL)
lobbied with Planned Parenthood for the School Age Mother
and Child Act of 1975, an ultimately unsuccessful bill that
would have funded childcare, health care, family planning, and
other services for adolescent mothers and children.122 The
group again sided with feminists in promoting the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act of 1978, supporting the law with or without
an exception for post-abortion leave for women.123 In 1978, the
ACCL helped to pass the Adolescent Health, Services,
Pregnancy Prevention and Care Act, a law that provided
extensive support and preventative services for young
mothers.124 These laws reflected a particularly influential
vision of the meaning of the right to life—one built partly on
efforts to expand the welfare state and the right to make a
121. Teenagers, ‘Responsible Sex Education,’ and Contraceptives, A.L.L. ABOUT
ISSUES, Apr. 1981, in The A.L.L. About Issues Folder, Wilcox Collection,
University of Kansas.
122. On the ACCL’s support, see School Age Mother and Child Health Act of
1975: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health of the S. Comm. of Labor and
Welfare, 94th Cong. 499 (1975) (statement of Marjory Mecklenburg). For a
description of the proposed law, see id. at 1–2, 10–16. For Planned Parenthood’s
support of the law, see id. at 552–81 (statement of Jack Hood Vaughn of Planned
Parenthood) (supporting the Act).
123. See Discrimination on the Basis of Pregnancy: Hearings on S. 995 Before
the Subcomm. on Labor Standards of the S. Comm. on Human Res., 95th Cong.
432–41 (1977) (statement of Jacqueline Nolan-Haley of American Citizens
Concerned for Life) (showing group’s support for the Act); Legislation to Prohibit
Sex Discrimination on the Basis of Pregnancy Part 2: Hearing on H.R. 5055 &
H.R. 6075 Before the H. Subcomm. on Emp’t Opportunities of the H. Comm. on
Educ. and Labor, 95th Cong. 66 (1977) (statement of Dr. Dorothy Czarnecki of
American Citizens Concerned for Life); Letter from Marjory Mecklenburg to
Representative James Tonry 1 (Mar. 8, 1978), in The American Citizens
Concerned for Life Papers, Box 19, Fundraising Folder (explaining that the ACCL
supported the PDA “as a pro-life bill with or without an abortion amendment”).
124. See Adolescent Health Services and Pregnancy Prevention and Care Act of
1978: Hearing on H.R. 12146 Before the S. Comm. on Human Res., 95th Cong.,
422–40 (1978) (statement of Marjory Mecklenburg) (supporting the Act); see id. at
192–93 (statement of Faye Wattleton of Planned Parenthood).
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living. The ACCL identified the root of the abortion problem as
follows:
[I]n the United States today by almost any standard 25
million people are poor, and discrimination against minority
groups seems to be endemic. In practice, liberty and
property are more valued than someone’s life.125

The solution, in the view of ACCL members, involved more
protective legislation, more robust antidiscrimination
protections for women, and a better social safety net for the
poor. As the group’s official materials explained: “If troubled
pregnant women are to have an opportunity to give birth to
healthy babies we must create a society that cares about both
and is willing to extend a hand of love and support.”126
In the evolution of antiabortion politics, intra-movement
identity contests helped to determine not only whether
activists could pursue social change but also what kinds of
shifts advocates could demand. As Part III will show, litigation
further changed the course of internal identity struggles.
Convinced that the movement stood the greatest chance of
making progress in the courts, activists not only channeled
more resources into litigation, but also reworked other
arguments and plans to advance court-oriented strategies. To
be sure, litigation represented only one of many factors—
including political party realignment, the emergence of the
New Right and the Religious Right, and even the personalities
and biographies of different leaders—that set the terms of
internal battles. Nonetheless, as Part III shows, litigation can
transform internal fights about what a social movement means.
III. IDENTITY AND VICTORIES IN COURT
Unwilling to waver from their commitment to abortion
bans with no exceptions, movement attorneys had consistently
asked the courts to recognize rights of the fetus or to overrule
125. William C. Hunt & Joseph A. Lampe, Strategy Considerations for ACCL
Involvement in Abortion and Related Issues 1–7 (n. d.), in The American Citizens
Concerned for Life Papers, Box 18, 1977 Strategy Folder.
126. ACCL Philosophy and Objectives (n. d.), in The American Citizens
Concerned for Life Papers, Box 17, ACCL Philosophy and Objectives Folder.
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Roe outright.127 However, in the mid-1970s, a group of lawyers
working in Chicago began experimenting with a different
litigation strategy. Rather than trying to convince the courts to
recognize a constitutional right to life, these attorneys
contended that Roe v. Wade protected only a narrow right to
abortion. Even under Roe, these attorneys stressed that many
abortion restrictions passed constitutional muster. Activists
first hoped that the strategy would give legislators more
freedom to restrict abortion. In the long term, by changing how
the courts interpreted the Roe decision, antiabortion attorneys
wanted to present it as unworkable and confusing. In
particular, focusing on Roe’s flaws allowed attorneys to make
the case that the decision represented a particularly egregious
example of judicial overreach and the abuse of federal power.
Highlighting the problems with the decision would set the
stage for its overruling.
With the movement now focused on overruling Roe,
activists made changes in the political arena, showcasing the
supposed tyranny of the Court and thereby creating an
argument that naturally appealed to conservative groups that
were already angry about big government. And as abortion
opponents focused more heavily on reshaping the Supreme
Court, coalition politics became more important than ever.
With powerful political allies, antiabortion activists hoped to
exert more influence over both presidential elections and
judicial selections. Starting in the early 1980s, movement
members could most effectively influence the nomination
process by siding with newly mobilized social conservatives.
Litigation helped to transform the movement’s strategy outside
of court as well as in it. The movement’s emphasis on litigation
played an important part in pushing the movement to the
political right.
In the mid-1970s, as section A explores, antiabortion
attorneys refined a new incremental litigation strategy
designed to narrow abortion rights and convince the public of
the Roe Court’s activism. Section B chronicles how activists
and attorneys reworked this approach to litigation, making it
into an overarching plan of attack for the movement. Section C
fleshes out the profound political consequences abortion

127.

See generally Ziegler, supra note 106.
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opponents faced after building movement tactics around
success in court.
A. The Birth of a Litigation Strategy
Litigation was nothing new to the antiabortion movement
of the 1970s. In addition to defending existing abortion bans,
some antiabortion activists went on the offensive, sometimes
seeking the appointment of a guardian ad litem to represent
fetuses scheduled for abortion.128 After 1973, abortion
opponents instead prioritized an Article V constitutional
amendment—one that would rewrite the Fourteenth
Amendment to outlaw all abortions.129 Some movement
members, including prominent movement attorney, NRLC and
AUL leader Dennis Horan, questioned the wisdom of this
tactic.130 More fundamentally, Horan argued for the value of “a
National Public Interest law firm, which would . . . spearhead
litigation toward the ultimate goal of reversing Roe v. Wade.”131
In trying to find new ways to attack the Roe decision, the
AUL would become a very different organization, one focused
on gradual changes in the courts. Quietly, the group honed a
new litigation strategy that it debuted during the litigation of
Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth.132
Danforth involved a multi-restriction Missouri statute,
requiring spousal consent, parental consultation, and written

128. The guardian ad litem cases included Byrn v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosps.
Corp., 335 N.Y.S. 2d 390 (App. Div. 1972). For more on the Byrn case, see Robert
E. Tomasson, A Lawyer Challenges the Abortion Law, N. Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1971, at
29; Order Is Sought in Abortion Suit: Judge Is Asked to Put Curb on Practice
During Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 1971, at 32; Judy Klemesrud, He’s the Legal
Guardian for the Fetuses About to Be Aborted, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1972, at 48.
For another key example of a guardian-ad-litem case, see Doe v. Scott, 321 F.
Supp. 1385 (N.D. Ill. 1971).
129. On the emphasis abortion opponents put on an Article V amendment in
the mid-1970s, see Cassidy, supra note 82, at 146; PATRICIA MILLER, GOOD
CATHOLICS: THE BATTLE OVER ABORTION IN THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 73 (2014).
130. On Horan’s skepticism about antiabortion preoccupation with a
constitutional amendment, see Letter from Dennis Horan to NRLC Policy
Committee 1–3 (Sept. 5, 1973), in The American Citizens Concerned for Life
Papers, Box 8, 1973 NRLC Folder 4 (telling colleagues that an amendment would
“solve only some, but not all, of our problems” and would require “further state
legislation in order to plug the loopholes”).
131. Id.
132. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
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consent before a woman could have an abortion.133 The AUL
intervened in one of the cases consolidated with Danforth, and
an AUL board member, Dr. Eugene Diamond, was appointed as
guardian ad litem for fetuses impacted by a similar Illinois
antiabortion statute.134 While the AUL’s amicus brief in
Danforth
repeated
many
conventional
antiabortion
constitutional arguments,135 the group emphasized that “each
justice who joined in this Honorable Court’s opinion in Roe v.
Wade . . . recognized that the right of privacy . . . is subject to
limitation.”136 The brief assumed that Roe required strict
judicial scrutiny of all abortion restrictions but nonetheless
argued that some regulations were narrowly tailored to serve
an important state interest.137 The brief highlighted dicta in
Roe indicating that the abortion decision was stressful and
high-stakes.138 Informed-consent regulations survived strict
scrutiny because “the requirement in no way infringes on [the
woman’s] right to have an abortion and does not regulate the
procedure itself.”139
Similarly, in defending Missouri’s spousal-consent
measure, the AUL emphasized that the Court had not decided
the issue of fathers’ rights.140 “There is nothing in Roe which
precludes the possibility that the state may raise separate
‘compelling’ interests beyond the two raised by the statutes of
Georgia and Texas of Roe and Doe,” the brief argued. “[H]ere,
the state’s interest is in [protecting] ‘the relation integrity,’
‘bilateral loyalty,’ ‘mutuality,’ and ‘harmony in living’ of the
marriage relation through balancing the procreative and
parental rights of husband and wife.”141
The Court’s decision in Danforth represented surprising
133. See id. at 58–59.
134. See Motion and Brief, Amicus Curiae of Dr. Eugene Diamond and Ams.
United for Life, Inc., in Support of Appellees in 74-1151 and Appellants in 74-1419
at *2–4, Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (Nos. 74-1151, 74-1419), 1976 WL 178721.
135. See id. at *35–42.
136. See id. at *45.
137. See id. at *46 (“The issue before this Honorable Court, then, is whether
the statutory provisions being challenged are protective of an important or
‘compelling’ state interest and whether they are ‘narrowly drawn to express only
the legitimate state interests at stake.’”).
138. See id. at *83–85.
139. Id. at *12.
140. See id. at *12–13.
141. Id. In Roe, the Court highlighted state interests in fetal life and maternal
health. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).
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progress for the antiabortion movement. The Court upheld
several parts of the Missouri statute.142 The majority rejected a
challenge to the statute’s definition of viability even though it
made no mention of the Roe trimester framework.143 The Court
also drew on the AUL’s logic in upholding a prior-consent
requirement. “The decision to abort . . . is an important, and
often a stressful one,” Justice Blackmun wrote for the majority,
“and it is desirable and imperative that it be made with full
knowledge of its nature and consequences.”144 Even in striking
down other parts of the statute, the Court framed these
measures as extraordinarily broad—awarding a functional veto
to either a woman’s spouse or parents.145
The AUL built on the advances made in Danforth in a
series of cases about one of the most intensely contested legal
issues of the 1970s—the constitutionality of laws limiting the
public funding of abortion. In 1976, Congress passed the Hyde
Amendment, a ban on the use of federal Medicaid funding for
most abortions, and many states followed suit.146 In Maher v.
Roe, the Court considered the constitutionality of a Connecticut
law authorizing Medicaid funding only for first-trimester
abortions that were deemed “medically necessary.”147 Poelker v.
Doe involved a St. Louis policy that prevented the performance
of elective abortions in city-owned hospitals.148 In a final case,
Beal v. Doe, the Court addressed whether Title XIX of the
federal Social Security Act required states participating in the
Medicaid program to fund abortions not certified as medically
necessary by a physician.149
The AUL’s brief in Poelker elaborated on the strategy
pioneered in Danforth—claiming deference to Roe while
rewriting its protections. First, the brief argued that the Court
had assigned the abortion right partly to the physician, who
could refuse to perform the procedure for any reason.150 Under
142. See Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 63–65
(1976).
143. See id. at 63–65.
144. Id. at 67.
145. See id. at 69, 75.
146. Pub. L. No. 94-439, 209, 90 Stat. 1418, 1434 (1976).
147. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 470–77 (1977).
148. See Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519, 521–22 (1977).
149. See Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 445–48 (1977).
150. See Motion and Brief, Amicus Curiae of Dr. Eugene Diamond and Ams.
United for Life, Inc., in Support of Appellees in 74-1151 and Appellants in 74-1419
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Roe, the Poelker brief argued that “the abortion decision is a
medical decision that cannot be effectuated unless it is arrived
at in consultation and in agreement with a physician.”151
Women had no right to access abortion. Rather, Roe gave
women nothing more than the right to ask someone else to
perform the procedure.152 As the brief framed it, the Court had
recognized a right belonging to a “woman in consultation with
her physician, not the woman alone demanding of her
physician.”153
A second and ultimately more successful argument
exploited the idea that abortion rights involved freedom from
state interference and nothing more. As the AUL Legal
Defense and Education Fund brief explained: “If the abortion
decision is so private . . . it follows that government shall not
itself be compelled to respond to the demand of the exercise of
that right.”154 If a woman could not afford an abortion or
required the services of a public hospital, the State had no
constitutional obligation to help her.155
Maher, the lead case, relied on privacy reasoning similar to
the AUL’s to cut back on abortion rights. The majority quickly
disposed of any argument involving discrimination on the basis
of wealth or class.156 In discussing a potential violation of the
woman’s right to privacy, the Court, like the AUL brief,
emphasized that “there is a basic difference between direct
state interference with a protected activity and state
encouragement of an alternative activity . . . .”157 As the Maher
Court framed it, poor women carried financial burdens that
had little to do with the State. “An indigent woman who desires
an abortion suffers no disadvantage as a consequence of
Connecticut’s decision to fund childbirth,” the majority
explained.158 “[S]he continues as before to be dependent on
at *7, 15, Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth 428 U.S. 52 (Nos. 74-1151,
74-1419), 1976 WL 178721.
151. See Motion and Brief, Amicus Curiae of Ams. United for Life, Inc. in
Support of Petitioner John H. Poelker at 7, Poelker 432 U.S. 519 (No. 75-442).
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. See Brief for Ams. United for Life as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner
at 17, Poelker 432 U.S. 519 (No. 01-1015).
155. See id.
156. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 475 (1977).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 474.
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private sources for the service she desires.”159 Maher followed
the AUL brief in describing abortion—and perhaps privacy
rights more broadly—as purely negative rights. If women
enjoyed nothing more than freedom from state meddling, the
State could deny poor women abortion funding with impunity.
Poelker and Beal picked up on the theme set out in Maher.
In Poelker, the Court upheld the St. Louis ban on abortions in
public hospitals, reasoning that the question presented was
“identical in principle with that presented by a State’s refusal
to provide Medicaid benefits for abortions while providing them
for childbirth.”160 Beal concluded that state Medicaid bans did
not conflict with the federal Social Security Act.161 By
emphasizing a narrow interpretation of Roe and asking only for
incremental change, the AUL seemed to have made a
substantial advance in the courts.
In antiabortion circles, Maher, Poelker, and Beal seemed to
represent a crucial turning point. AUL leader Dr. Joseph
Stanton used these victories in arguing that litigation was “the
most important aspect of the pro-life movement at this time.”162
Mildred Jefferson, then the president of the largest national
antiabortion organization, urged “[e]veryone who speaks in the
right to life movement or who participates in the educational
effort in any way” to read Maher, Beal, and Poelker.163 The
National Right to Life News described the 1977 wins in the
Supreme Court as “historic.”164 Delighted by the success of its
litigation strategies, the AUL redefined itself, elevating an
attorney to the position of executive director and recognizing a
“change in the thrust of the organization.”165 What had been an
159. Id.
160. Poelker, 432 U.S. at 521.
161. Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 447–48 (1977).
162. Letter from Dr. Joseph Stanton to AUL Board of Directors 1 (Aug. 1977),
in The George Huntston Williams Papers, Box 5, Folder 7, Andover-Harvard
Theological Library, Harvard Divinity School.
163. Mildred Jefferson, Lifelines, NAT’L RIGHT TO LIFE NEWS, Aug. 17, 1977, at
9, in The National Right to Life News Collection, 1977 Box, Dr. Joseph R. Stanton
Human Life Issues Library and Resource Center, Sisters for Life Convent, Bronx,
New York.
164. Liz Jeffries, Court Rules Funding Not Required, NAT’L RIGHT TO LIFE
NEWS, Aug. 17, 1977, at 1, 3, in The National Right to Life News Collection, 1977
Box, Dr. Joseph R. Stanton Human Life Issues Library and Resource Center,
Sisters for Life Convent, Bronx, New York.
165. AUL Board of Directors Meeting Minutes 4–6 (Oct. 29, 1977), in The
George Huntston Williams Papers, Box 5, Folder 7, Andover-Harvard Theological
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educational organization now focused on incremental legal
change.
B. Incrementalism Becomes an Overarching Plan of
Attack
The success of incremental litigation encouraged the
antiabortion movement as a whole to change direction, turning
away from efforts to amend the Constitution or create direct
protections for a right to life. The NRLC used the victories in
Maher and Poelker to raise as much as $30,000—an
extraordinary amount of money for an organization reportedly
$25,000 in debt during that period.166 Attorneys and political
operatives across movement organizations drew on these
victories in setting forth a new strategy. Rather than focusing
solely on a fetal-protective Article V amendment, movement
members began prioritizing efforts to chip away at Roe itself.
As had been the case in Maher, Poelker, and Beal, activists
could push through laws at the state and city level that would
limit access to abortion.167 Then, movement attorneys could
persuade the Supreme Court to uphold those regulations. This
strategy would, in the words of litigator James Bopp, Jr., give
the “states . . . considerable latitude to regulate abortions short
of prohibition.”168
Movement attorneys hoped to reduce the number of
abortions performed and convince women to forswear the
Library, Harvard Divinity School.
166. On the amount of money raised using the Maher and Poelker litigation,
see id. at 3, 8. On the NRLC’s reported debt in the period, see CONNIE PAIGE, THE
RIGHT TO LIFERS: WHO THEY ARE, HOW THEY OPERATE, WHERE THEY GET THEIR
MONEY 87 (1983).
167. For antiabortion accounts of this strategy, see James Bopp, Jr., Akron
Analysis, NAT’L RIGHT TO LIFE NEWS, Oct. 10, 1979, at 3, in The National Right to
Life News Collection, 1979 Box, Dr. Joseph R. Stanton Human Life Issues Library
and Resource Center, Sisters for Life Convent, Bronx, New York; James Bopp, Jr.,
Akron Type Laws Buoyed by Court Decisions, NAT’L RIGHT TO LIFE NEWS,
November 1979, at 20, in The National Right to Life News Collection, 1979 Box,
Dr. Joseph R. Stanton Human Life Issues Library and Resource Center, Sisters
for Life Convent, Bronx, New York; AUL Perspective, LEX VITAE, Feb. 1, 1979, at
5–6, in The Lex Vitae Folder, Wilcox Collection, University of Kansas.
168. Bopp, supra note 167; see also AUL Perspective, supra note 167 (“The
challenge, therefore, to the Right to Life movement is to enact carefully drawn
legislation and to present sound legal argumentation in the courts in support of
these laws.”).
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procedure altogether. At the same time, by constantly
undercutting and remaking the Roe decision, antiabortion
attorneys could expose it as unworkable and constitutionally
unsound. From start to finish, the movement would pursue
restrictions with the “reasonable hope” that the Court would
uphold them.169
Subsequently, movement attorneys experimented with a
new incremental tactic in Harris v. McRae,170 a case in which
the constitutionality of the Hyde Amendment’s ban on
Medicaid funding for abortion was at issue.171 Activists had
already worked to narrow Roe’s protections, but in Harris,
movement lawyers wanted to introduce chaos into abortion
doctrine, strengthening the case that the 1973 opinion was
unworkable. To advance this agenda, NRLC attorneys insisted
that Roe and its progeny had created an “undue burden
test.”172 As the NRLC brief in Harris maintained:
[I]f the regulation impacts upon the abortion decision, the
Court must find as a matter of fact that this burdens an
individual’s right to decide to . . . terminate pregnancy by
substantially limiting access to the means of effectuating
that decision.173

169. Ruling on Akron Abortion Ordinance Called Victory, NAT’L RIGHT TO LIFE
NEWS, Oct. 10, 1979, at 1, 3, in The National Right to Life News Collection, 1979
Box, Dr. Joseph R. Stanton Human Life Issues Library and Resource Center,
Sisters for Life Convent, Bronx, New York.
170. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
171. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
172. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Nat’l Right to Life Comm., Inc. for
Appellees Williams and Diamond at *5–11, Williams v. Zbaraz, 448 U.S. 358
(1980) (No. 79-4), 1980 WL 339450. The NRLC drew on dicta in Carey v.
Population Serv. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976);
and Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977). See Brief as Amicus Curiae of the Nat’l
Right to Life Comm., supra note 172, at *5–11. None of these cases clearly set
forth an undue-burden test applicable to adult women. Both Carey and Bellotti
involved the constitutional rights of minors. See Carey, 431 U.S. at 697–98;
Bellotti, 428 U.S. at 147. Carey clearly required that a law be narrowly tailored to
serve a compelling government interest. Carey, 431 U.S. at 689. While Maher did
use undue-burden rhetoric, see 432 U.S. at 487, 489, the Court insisted that it had
in no way retreated from the approach taken in Roe itself. The NRLC’s undueburden argument represented a new creation rather than a straightforward gloss
on existing precedent.
173. Brief as Amicus Curiae for the Nat’l Right to Life Comm., supra note 172,
at *6 (quotation omitted).
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NRLC attorneys first insisted that not all abortion regulations
had anything to do with a woman’s abortion decision. So long
as the government interfered only with doctors’ prerogatives,
judges should apply rational basis review.174 The NRLC also
asserted that even if a law impacted a woman’s decision, not all
burdens were undue.175 As the NRLC reasoned, “a requirement
for a lawful abortion is not unconstitutional unless it unduly
burdens the right to seek an abortion.”176 If Roe’s meaning
could be changed, abortion opponents hoped to argue more
effectively that the decision was incoherent.
After Harris upheld the Hyde Amendment,177 abortion
opponents redoubled their commitment to hollowing out Roe’s
protections. The movement pursued a two-part strategy. First,
movement attorneys would convince the Court to narrow the
right set out in the 1973 decision. At the same time, as abortion
doctrine became increasingly unstable, advocates would
highlight the activism of the Court, putting more pressure on
the justices to undermine abortion rights or reject them
altogether. For example, in 1981, NRLC leader John Willke
denounced the activism of the Roe Court.178 “The Supreme
Court’s 1973 abortion decision had no authentic basis in the
Constitution,” Willke asserted.179 “Rather, it constituted the
most extreme example of ‘judicial activism’ in this century.”180
Starting in 1983, similar arguments played a central role
in movement litigation, after antiabortion attorneys defended
an Akron, Ohio, ordinance designed to survive judicial
scrutiny.181 The ordinance included measures requiring that
174. See id. at *6–11.
175. See id.
176. Id. at *7 (quotation omitted).
177. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316–17 (1980).
178. See Nomination of Sandra Day O’Connor: Hearings Before the S. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 334 (1981) (statement of Dr. John Willke).
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Abortion opponents submitted several amicus briefs in the Akron case.
See Brief as Amicus Curiae of Feminists for Life in Support of Petitioner, City of
Akron, City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health (Akron I), 462 U.S. 416
(1983) (No. 81-746), 1982 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 150; Brief of Amicus Curiae of
the Catholic League for Religious and Civil Rights in Support of the Petitioner in
No. 81–746 and the Respondent in No. 81–1172, Akron I, 462 U.S. 416, 1982 U.S.
S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 152; Brief as Amicus Curiae of Womankind, Inc. in Support of
Petitioner, City of Akron, Akron I, 462 U.S. 416 (No. 81-746), 1982 U.S. S. Ct.
Briefs LEXIS 1498; Brief as Amicus Curiae of Ams. United for Life in Support of

ZIEGLER_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1312

6/19/2015 10:09 AM

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86

first-trimester abortions be performed in a hospital, mandating
parental consultation and informed consent, setting forth a
waiting period, and regulating the disposal of fetal tissue.182
Although the Court in Akron I struck down major parts of the
challenged ordinance,183 Sandra Day O’Connor dissented,
picking up on the undue-burden framework articulated by
movement attorneys.184 In a dissent joined by Justices
Rehnquist and White, Justice O’Connor contended: “The
‘unduly burdensome’ standard is particularly appropriate in
the abortion context because of the nature and scope of the
right that is involved.”185 Importantly, O’Connor reiterated
movement arguments that Roe was unworkable, reinforcing
the view that the best way forward for the antiabortion
movement was through the courts.186
C. The Antiabortion Movement Lays the Groundwork for
Overruling Roe
The more success antiabortion litigators enjoyed, the more
activists inside and outside of court emphasized the flaws of
the Roe decision and the tyranny of the judiciary, aligning the
movement with conservatives who were already upset about
big government. In the aftermath of Akron I, the undue-burden
test played an increasingly prominent role in the effort to get
rid of Roe. Convincing the Court to rely on such a test would
give states more latitude in restricting abortion. At the same
time, by muddying abortion doctrine, antiabortion attorneys
hoped to build a case for overruling Roe. Antiabortion
attorneys—increasingly
supported
by
the
Reagan
Administration—used the Court’s inconsistent treatment of
abortion laws as a justification for setting aside the Roe
decision. The Court’s very willingness to adopt the undueburden test showed that Roe was unworkable—that the
doctrine the justices applied was unsound and in need of
Petitioner, City of Akron, Akron I, 462 U.S. 416 (No. 81-746), 1982 U.S. S. Ct.
Briefs LEXIS 1499.
182. Akron I, 462 U.S. at 422–25.
183. Id. at 452.
184. See id. at 452–73 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
185. Id. at 463.
186. See id. at 458 (concluding that “[t]he Roe framework, then, is clearly on a
collision course with itself”).
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constant revision. The movement’s litigation strategy played up
the irresponsibility and activism of the Court. As the
movement put more emphasis on litigation, movement
members already interested in aligning with the Republican
Party and the political Right exercised more influence.
An amicus brief submitted on behalf of the United States
highlighted Roe’s unworkability during the 1981 litigation of
Akron I,187 but efforts to destabilize Roe came most clearly to
the surface in 1988, when the Court agreed to hear Webster v.
Reproductive Health Services.188 Like Danforth, Webster
involved a multi-part Missouri abortion regulation, but a great
deal had changed since 1976.189 Ronald Reagan and George
H.W. Bush had reshaped the Court, and those justices still
strongly supportive of abortion rights—including Blackmun
and Brennan—seemed close to retirement.190 The Justice
Department gave a ringing endorsement to arguments about
Roe’s overreaching,191 as did powerful and well-funded New
Right and Religious Right organizations.192 It seemed that the
time had come to expose Roe’s supposed flaws and ask openly
for its overruling.
The NRLC again took the lead in this effort, insisting that
the Court once and for all reject its reasoning in Roe. “Failure
to confront the issue of Roe’s viability,” the NRLC noted,
“would lead to . . . continued, interminable litigation of the
187. See Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners
at *6–15, Akron I, 462 U.S. 416 (No. 81-746), 1982 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1544.
188. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
189. For the statute at issue in Webster, see id. at 498–504.
190. On contemporary perceptions that Webster would overrule Roe, see
HOWARD BALL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE INTIMATE LIVES OF AMERICANS:
BIRTH, SEX, CHILDREARING, AND DEATH 104 (2002); LEE EPSTEIN & JOSEPH
KOBLYKLA, THE SUPREME COURT AND LEGAL CHANGE: ABORTION AND THE DEATH
PENALTY 295–98 (1992).
191. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants
at *1, Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (No. 88–605), 1989
WL 1127640 (“The United States continues to believe that Roe v. Wade unduly
restricts the proper sphere of legislative authority in this area and should be
overruled by this Court.”).
192. For examples of the briefs submitted by Religious Right and New Right
organizations in Webster, see Brief as Amicus Curiae of the Ctr. for Judicial
Studies et al. in Support of Appellants, Webster, 492 U.S. 490 (No. 88–605), 1989
WL 1127626; Brief as Amicus Curiae of Am. Family Ass’n, Inc. in Support of
Appellants, Webster, 492 U.S. 490 (No. 88–605), 1989 WL 1127633; Brief as Amici
Curiae of Focus on the Family et al. in Support of Appellants, Webster, 492 U.S.
490 (No. 88–605), 1989 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1543.
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subject of abortion in this and lower courts.”193 The
antiabortion movement’s very preoccupation with litigation
became an argument for overruling Roe: anything less would
leave the Court to confront more challenges led by antiabortion
attorneys. In the NRLC’s analysis, the doctrinal uncertainty
surrounding abortion—something very much pursued by
antiabortion litigators—reflected the fundamental flaws in Roe.
“Rather than making the lines of abortion procedure clearer,”
the NRLC argued, “the decisions of this Court have made the
‘bright lines’ of Roe blurred.”194
Significantly, arguments about Roe’s incoherence
resonated with a powerful group of allies, including Republican
political leaders and New Right movement organizations.
Recently-formed Religious Right organizations like Focus on
the Family and the Family Research Council adopted the
NRLC’s reasoning wholeheartedly in Webster, arguing: “Roe v.
Wade embarked this Court on a road of legislative line
drawing, scientific and medical review, and judicial rulemaking
unmoored to constitutional reasoning.”195 Amicus briefs
submitted on behalf of the Justice Department and individual
members of Congress followed a similar approach.196
Success in court created a kind of strategic path
dependence for a movement desperate for signs of progress. In
trying to replicate the results of Maher, Poelker, and Beal,
leading antiabortion activists privileged efforts to chip away at
Roe and expose its flaws.197 The more the movement committed
to arguments about judicial overreaching, the more abortion
opponents could align with newly mobilized social
conservatives angry about recent decisions of the Supreme
Court.198
Right-leaning Americans had protested against perceived
judicial tyranny since the Warren Court’s decisions on school
193. Brief as Amicus Curiae of the Nat’l Right to Life Comm., Inc. in Support
of Appellants at *11, Webster, 492 U.S. 490 (No. 88-605), 1989 WL 1127669.
194. Id. at *14.
195. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants at *1,
Webster, 492 U.S. 490 (No. 88–605), 1989 WL 1127640.
196. See id. at 1; Brief as Amici Curiae of Hon. Chris Smith et al. in Support of
Appellants at *10, Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (No. 88605), 1989 WL 1127607 (“Roe has proven to be inherently difficult to apply in any
consistent and principled manner.”).
197. See supra Part III.
198. See supra Part III.
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prayer and criminal procedure. They had flooded the Supreme
Court with letters of protest and even demanded the
impeachment of Chief Justice Earl Warren.199 When the
federal courts began mandating intra- and inter-district busing
as a remedy for school segregation, protesters again
highlighted supposed judicial overreaching.200 By the early
1980s, together with Ronald Reagan, Paul Weyrich’s New
Right united single-issue groups behind opposition to the
damage done by “big government.”201 In a 1980 speech, for
example, Reagan asserted that leaders of the federal
government had “begun to think they can be parent; they can
be teacher; they can be clergyman. And I think it is time to get
the Government back to what it was supposed to be 200 years
ago, and that is a servant of the people.”202 Reagan’s message
attracted grassroots conservatives concerned about “sex
education in public schools, court rulings that have prohibited
prayers in the schools and regulations that allow teen-age girls
to have abortions without their parents’ knowledge.”203
Strategically, identifying a common enemy allowed social
conservatives, in the words of one activist, to “get a lot more
accomplished.”204 The New Right offered political expertise,
access to direct mail networks, and financial stability to
previously struggling single-issue groups.205 United, social
199. On efforts to impeach Earl Warren, see CHRISTINE L. COMPSTON, EARL
WARREN: JUSTICE FOR ALL 130 (2001); G. EDWARD WHITE, EARL WARREN: A
PUBLIC LIFE 247–48 (1982). On protests of the Warren Court’s school prayer
decisions, see BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION
HAS INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE
CONSTITUTION 261–67 (2009); DANIEL K. WILLIAMS, GOD’S OWN PARTY: THE
MAKING OF THE CHRISTIAN RIGHT 62–67 (2d ed. 2012).
200. On the busing protests, see generally RONALD P. FORMISANO, BOSTON
AGAINST BUSING: RACE, CLASS, AND ETHNICITY IN THE 1960S AND 1970S (2d ed.
2012); JONATHAN RIEDER, CANARSIE: THE JEWS AND ITALIANS OF BROOKLYN
AGAINST LIBERALISM 2–3, 207–32 (1985).
201. See Mary Ziegler, The Politics of Constitutional Federalism, 91 DENV. U.
L. REV. ONLINE 217, 223 (2014).
202. David E. Rosenbaum, Conservatives Embrace Reagan on Social Issues,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 1980, at B12.
203. Id.
204. Leslie Bennetts, Conservatives Join on Social Issues, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 30,
1980, at B6.
205. On the pragmatic reasons antiabortion activists had for partnering with
the New Right, see WILLIAMS, supra note 199, at 169–70; Mary Ziegler, Women’s
Rights on the Right: The History and Stakes of Modern Pro-life Feminism, 28
BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 232, 248–54 (2013) [hereinafter Ziegler, Women’s
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conservatives appeared to have greater political influence.
Moreover, the message advanced by Reagan and New Right
leaders like Weyrich appealed to a variety of movement
conservatives “concerned that the federal government [had]
intruded in a massive way into such areas that concern them
as the family, religion, and the home.”206 “The bottom line of
pro-family people,” explained anti-feminist Phyllis Schlafly, “is
get the federal government off our backs.”207
Throughout the 1970s, abortion opponents had remained
largely on the sidelines of the academic and popular struggle
over judicial restraint.208 Indeed, movement members—divided
by their views on the meaning of their cause and the goals they
should pursue—generally agreed that the courts should go
beyond the text and history of the Constitution in identifying
constitutional rights, a move widely derided by critics of
judicial activism.209 The more abortion opponents fixated on an
incrementalist litigation strategy, the closer the movement
grew to other popular movements against supposed judicial
overreach. In 1987, for example, when Reagan nominated
Robert Bork to the Supreme Court, the National Right to Life
News reported:
The certainty of Bork-bashing by the abortionists has
nothing to do with Judge Bork’s personal views, which are
unknown. Rather it has everything to do with his oftrepeated view that judges must exercise self-restraint,
particularly in resisting the temptation to create “rights”
not mentioned in the Constitution.210

Rights on the Right: The History and Stakes of Modern Pro-life Feminism]; Mary
Ziegler, The Possibility of Compromise: Anti-Abortion Moderates After Roe v.
Wade, 87 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 571, 588 (2012) [hereinafter Ziegler, The Possibility
of Compromise: Anti-Abortion Moderates After Roe v. Wade].
206. Bennetts, supra note 204, at A1.
207. Id.
208. See generally Ziegler, Women’s Rights on the Right: The History and
Stakes of Modern Pro-life Feminism, supra note 205; Ziegler, The Possibility of
Compromise: Anti-Abortion Moderates After Roe v. Wade, supra note 205.
209. See id.
210. Bork Nomination Draws Massive Pro-Abortion Fire, NAT’L RIGHT TO LIFE
NEWS, Jul. 16, 1987, at 1, in The National Right to Life News Collection, 1987
Box, Dr. Joseph R. Stanton Human Life Issues Library and Resource Center,
Sisters for Life Convent, Bronx, New York.
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In 1988, in the aftermath of Bork’s failed nomination, the
National Right to Life News reiterated that theirs was a fight
against judicial activism:
A pro-life President can appoint judges who will honestly
interpret the Constitution and reverse Roe v. Wade, putting
the issue in the legislative arena where the pro-life
movement has demonstrated against incredible odds that it
can win.211

Movement preoccupation with incremental litigation
strengthened the hand of those who identified their cause with
the political right. Convinced that a fetal-protective
amendment was out of reach, abortion opponents directed more
and more attention to convincing the courts to reject or gut the
Roe decision. If activists could not remake the Constitution,
they hoped to transform the courts. Again, the most promising
path seemed to lie with an alliance with critics of supposed
judicial overreaching. However, as section D shows, litigation
alone did not guarantee that abortion opponents would partner
with the Right and the Republican Party. Since the 1970s,
Republican operatives had worked to use abortion as a wedge
issue, thereby wooing certain Catholic and Southern voters
who had conventionally sided with the Democratic Party. In
part, the alliance between abortion opponents and members of
the Right represented the culmination of a longstanding
campaign to expand the Republican base. At the same time, as
the antiabortion movement struggled to shore up its finances
and increase its influence, aligning with the Right seemed to be
the most pragmatic choice. Abortion opponents focused so
much on litigation partly because changes to the larger
political climate made a partnership with the Right more
realistic and valuable.
D. Litigation Plays a Part in a Much More Complex Story
Understanding

how

antiabortion

litigators

forged

a

211. David N. O’Steen & Darla St. Martin, What’s At Stake for Babies in 1988,
NAT’L RIGHT TO LIFE NEWS, Jan. 1988, at 1, in The National Right to Life News
Collection, 1988 Box, Dr. Joseph R. Stanton Human Life Issues Library and
Resource Center, Sisters for Life Convent, Bronx, New York.
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strategy attractive to the political Right requires an account of
the larger political and social circumstances that solidified the
relationship between the antiabortion movement and social
conservatives. Antiabortion litigators had such success in
building alliances with the Right partly because Republicans
had consistently pursued antiabortion supporters. Moreover, in
the aftermath of political party realignment, a financiallystrapped antiabortion movement needed the support promised
by a partnership with opponents of big government.
In part, abortion opponents turned to incremental
litigation because they found a receptive audience in
Republican and conservative strategists already courting
Catholics and others who were uncomfortable with legal
abortion. Starting in 1972, Richard Nixon tried to lure
Catholics away from the Democratic Party, accusing his
opponent, George McGovern, of supporting acid, amnesty, and
abortion.212 Later in the decade, as right-wing operatives
worked to force the Republican Party to endorse more
conservative policies, Paul Weyrich, an architect of the New
Right, viewed abortion as a promising wedge issue.213
At the same time, political party realignment made an
alliance with conservatives the only realistic option for an
isolated antiabortion movement. As late as 1976, neither major
presidential candidate (nor either party platform) had taken a
strong stand on abortion.214 By 1980, with Ronald Reagan at
the helm, the Republican Party endorsed both a fetal-protective
amendment and Medicaid funding bans.215 In the same period,
because of an ever-closer relationship with the women’s
212. See Donald T. Critchlow, Birth Control, Population Control, and Family
Planning: An Overview, in THE POLITICS OF ABORTION AND BIRTH CONTROL IN
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, supra note 82, at 14.
213. See Chip Berlet, The New Political Right in the United States: Reaction,
Rollback, and Resentment, in CONFRONTING THE NEW CONSERVATISM: THE RISE
OF THE RIGHT IN AMERICA 84–85 (Michael Thompson ed., 2007).
214. On the 1976 Democratic Platform, see Gerhard Peters & John T. Woolley,
AM.
PRESIDENCY
PROJECT,
Democratic
Party
Platform
of
1976,
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29606 (last visited Jan. 27, 2015),
archived at http://perma.cc/GU5Y-FPVU. For the Republican Party Platform, see
Gerhard Peters & John T. Woolley, Republican Party Platform of 1976, AM.
PRESIDENCY PROJECT, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25843 (last visited
Jan. 27, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/8RQU-RW94.
215. See Gerhard Peters & John T. Woolley, Republican Party Platform of
1980, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25844
(last visited Jan. 27, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/22EZ-DHJB.
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movement, the Democratic Party and incumbent Jimmy Carter
supported Roe as the law of the land.216 An alliance with critics
of judicial activism—already attractive because of the
movement’s commitment to litigation—seemed to be the only
viable strategy for an antiabortion movement seeking political
relevance. A partnership with social conservatives also
promised financial stability to a movement struggling to stay
out of debt. Even the NRLC, the largest and most influential
antiabortion organization, was in serious debt at a time when
the Moral Majority, a Religious Right organization founded in
1979, boasted a $6 million budget.217 The resources available
through the New Right and Religious Right seemed
particularly crucial when many in the antiabortion movement
despaired of passing a fetal-protective amendment to the
Constitution in the near term.
In 1982, with the movement claiming a majority in
Congress and support in the White House, abortion opponents
celebrated when a federalism amendment—one that would
have allowed Congress and the states to restrict abortion—
made it out of congressional committee for the first time.218
However, with antiabortion activists deeply divided over
whether the amendment went far enough, Republicans could
not find the votes to overcome a filibuster led by Senator
216. See Gerhard Peters & John T. Woolley, Democratic Party Platform of
1980, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29607
(last visited Jan. 27, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/9ZF3-Y8ZR. As Linda
Greenhouse and Reva Siegel have shown, the process of party realignment began
before the Roe decision. Linda Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel, Before (and After)
Roe v. Wade: New Questions About Backlash, 120 YALE L.J. 2028, 2052–78 (2011);
see also Thomas J. Sugrue & John Skrentny, The White Ethnic Strategy, in
RIGHTWARD BOUND: MAKING AMERICA CONSERVATIVE IN THE 1970S 174–75
(Bruce J. Shulman & Julian E. Zelizer eds., 2008); CHRISTINA WOLBRECHT, THE
POLITICS OF WOMEN’S RIGHTS: PARTIES, POSITIONS, AND CHANGE 40–71 (2000).
217. On the NRLC’s reported debt in the period, see PAIGE, supra note 166, at
87. On the Moral Majority’s operating budget in the late 1970s, see DAN GILGOFF,
THE JESUS MACHINE: HOW JAMES DOBSON, FOCUS ON THE FAMILY, AND
EVANGELICAL AMERICA ARE WINNING THE CULTURE WAR 82–83 (2008). For more
on the wealth accumulated by Religious Right organizations, see Maxwell Glen,
The Electronic Ministers Listen to the Gospel According to the Candidates, NAT’L
J., Dec. 22, 1979, at 2142–45.
218. See Bernard Weinraub, Abortion Curbs Endorsed, 10-7, by Senate Panel,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 1982, at A1. For background on the federalism amendment
introduced by Senator Orrin Hatch (R-UT), see Leslie Bennetts, Antiabortion
Forces in Disarray Less Than a Year After Victories in Elections, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
22, 1981, at B5.
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Robert Packwood (R-OR).219 When the Senate voted down a
second federalism proposal by a vote of 49-50-1, frustrated
activists began looking for an alternative solution.220
With a constitutional amendment out of reach, many
abortion opponents concluded that progress would come only
with the remaking of the Supreme Court. In the late 1970s,
AUL leader Dennis Horan reported that Jimmy Carter had
blacklisted antiabortion candidates when filling federal judicial
vacancies, further convincing abortion opponents of the
importance of influencing presidential elections and judicial
selections.221 Ellen McCormack, a one-time antiabortion
presidential candidate, agreed that the courts represented the
movement’s best chance for constitutional change.222 The
movement needed to ensure that “[p]ro-abortion forces” no
longer had “more impact than pro-life forces in the judicial
selection process.”223
Just the same, the movement’s investment in litigation
made a substantial difference to abortion opponents’ struggles
over identity, coalition building, and legal priorities. By
delivering tangible results, the movement’s incremental
approach—even applied outside the courts—attracted
adherents who would not have otherwise embraced social
conservatism. In a closely divided movement, the promise of
progress made all the difference.
In the new world of abortion politics that litigators helped
to create, those antiabortion activists who favored welfare
rights struggled to find a place. Some, like Marjory
219. On the filibuster, see Robert Pear, Filibuster Starts Abortion Debate, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 17, 1982, at A18; Robert Pear, Baker Sets Vote After Labor Day on
Ending Filibuster on Abortion and School Prayer, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1982, at 9;
Steven V. Roberts, Senate Kills Plan to Curb Abortion by a Vote of 47-46, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 16, 1982, at A1.
220. On the failure of the Hatch-Eagleton Amendment, see NAT’L COMM. FOR A
HUMAN LIFE AMENDMENT, HUMAN LIFE AMENDMENT: MAJOR TEXTS 1–2 (2004),
available at http://www.nchla.org/datasource/idocuments/HLAmajortexts.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/WK94-8XEL.
221. See Federal Judgeships Denied to Pro-Lifers, Says Horan, NAT’L RIGHT TO
LIFE NEWS, Feb. 1979, at 17, in The National Right to Life News Collection, 1979
Box, Dr. Joseph R. Stanton Human Life Issues Library and Resource Center,
Sisters for Life Convent, Bronx, New York.
222. See Ellen McCormack, Can Right to Life Do Anything About the Power of
the Courts?, ELLEN MCCORMACK REP., Jan. 1978, at 1, 6, in The Ellen
McCormack Report Folder, Wilcox Collection, University of Kansas.
223. Id. at 5.
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Mecklenburg, discounted their earlier positions. Reagan
selected Mecklenburg to head the Office of Family Planning
Programs in the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare, and Mecklenburg largely set aside her earlier support
for birth control, promoting abstinence-centered education as
an alternative.224 Other activists maintained their earlier
constitutional commitments but rarely shaped the conversation
within the larger antiabortion movement.225
Social conservatives’ fight against big government left
little room for the protections for poor and vulnerable persons
that were once demanded by antiabortion activists. The
Reagan Administration committed to dismantling a welfare
state that it viewed as inefficient and counterproductive.226
Whereas some abortion opponents had argued that dependent
and vulnerable persons had a right to more protection from the
State, the Reagan Administration called on Americans to
“escape the spider’s web of dependency.”227 Reagan’s dramatic
224. On Mecklenburg’s nomination, see ALEXANDRA M. LORD, CONDOM
NATION: THE U.S. GOVERNMENT’S SEX EDUCATION CAMPAIGN FROM WORLD WAR I
TO THE INTERNET 143 (2010). While working for Reagan, Mecklenburg proposed a
“squeal rule,” requiring all federally funded clinics to report immediately if any
adolescent requested contraception. See STEVE CHAPPLE & DAVID TALBOT,
BURNING DESIRES: SEX IN AMERICA 79 (1989). The Reagan Administration first
proposed the squeal rule in 1982, and in February 1983, a federal district court
held that it was unlawful. See Associated Press, U. S. Plans to Appeal Ruling on
Teen-Ager Birth Control, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1983, at A21. When an appeals
court affirmed this ruling, the Reagan Administration gave up on the squeal rule.
See Marjorie Hunter, Court Blocks Rule on Notice by Family Planning Clinics,
N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 9, 1983, at 5 (noting the first of four appeals-court decisions
ruling against the squeal rule); U.S. Drops Efforts for Notice of Child’s Birth
Control Use, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 1983, at B13. Mecklenburg also reportedly
oversaw the Adolescent Family Life Act of 1981 (AFLA), a grant program
designed to curb adolescent pregnancy rates. In guiding the selection of AFLA
reviewers and grantees, Mecklenburg supposedly promoted a policy vision that
was both antiabortion and anti-birth control. JANICE M. IRVINE, TALK ABOUT SEX:
THE BATTLES OVER SEX EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES 88–97 (2002).
225. Groups like Consistent Life and All Our Lives continue to seek common
ground on issues like the death penalty, contraception, equal pay for women, and
nuclear proliferation. See, e.g., Ziegler, Women’s Rights on the Right: The History
and Stakes of Modern Pro-life Feminism, supra note 205, at 262–63.
226. On Reagan’s commitment to reshaping the welfare state, see STEVEN F.
HAYWARD, THE AGE OF REAGAN: THE FALL OF THE OLD LIBERAL ORDER 245–46
(2001); DANIEL BÉLAND & ALEX WADDAN, THE POLITICS OF POLICY CHANGE:
WELFARE, MEDICARE, AND SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM IN THE UNITED STATES 44
(2012).
227. Ronald Reagan, U.S. President, Address Before a Joint Session of
Congress on the State of the Union (Feb. 4, 1986), available at
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budget cuts—a 17.4 percent reduction in funding for the AFDC
and a 14.3 percent cut to the Food Stamp program—shrank the
social safety net.228 Closely aligned with the Right, even those
abortion opponents who defined themselves as champions of
rights for the poor stood little chance of expanding the welfare
state.
The movement’s embrace of mainstream conservative
politics alienated some hardliners who were persuaded that the
movement had not done enough to reverse the sexual
revolution, with the absolutists in the movement worrying that
a court-centered strategy did too little to challenge lax sexual
mores or to ban abortion outright. Organizations like Judie
Brown’s American Life League (ALL) and Joseph Scheidler’s
Pro-Life Action League took issue with the mainstream
movement’s emphasis on gradual progress. Brown and her
allies pledged to “continue our support for only that legislation
which recognizes the need for personhood to be extended to the
preborn child.”229 Scheidler stepped up protests and “sidewalk
counseling” outside of abortion clinics, paving the way for
massive “rescue” protests in the late 1980s.230 Absolutists, as
Judie Brown explained, rejected the idea that incremental
statutes had become the “only avenue open to [the pro-life
movement] at the time ‘politically.’”231 If incrementalism
prevailed, politicians could claim to be pro-life without ever
delivering the kinds of legal protections the movement truly
demanded. As an ally of Brown’s explained, if legislators
defeated compromise laws, “it would be easy to say that
nothing is ‘possible’ so we must accept defeat and ‘get on’ to
other things.”232

http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=36646, archived at http://perma.cc/P9BZS3TT.
228. See JAMES PETRAS & MORRIS MORLEY, EMPIRE OR REPUBLIC?: AMERICAN
GLOBAL POWER AND DOMESTIC DECAY 91 (1995).
229. President’s Column: Personhood, Please, A.L.L. ABOUT ISSUES, Jan. 1982,
at 1, in The A.L.L. About Issues Folder, Wilcox Collection, University of Kansas.
230. See RISEN & THOMAS, supra note 117, at 105–17. For Scheidler’s
perspective on antiabortion strategy, see JOSEPH SCHEIDLER, CLOSED: 99 WAYS
TO STOP ABORTION (1985).
231. President’s Column: Beware of False Friends, A.L.L. ABOUT ISSUES, Sept.
1981, in The A.L.L. About Issues Folder, Wilcox Collection, University of Kansas.
232. James Schall, Political Wrong Turn Disheartens Pro-Lifers, A.L.L. ABOUT
ISSUES, Apr. 1982, 3, in The A.L.L. About Issues Folder, Wilcox Collection,
University of Kansas.

ZIEGLER_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

6/19/2015 10:09 AM

IDENTITY CONTESTS

1323

Absolutists like Brown helped to create a schism in the
movement not only by questioning the ideology of mainstream
groups but also by relying more often on direct action protest.
Over the course of the late 1980s and early 1990s, protestors
blockaded 525 clinics, and law enforcement officials arrested
over 31,000 pro-life protestors.233 The fault line in the
antiabortion movement carried forward into the early 2010s, as
absolutists mounted state campaigns for constitutional
amendments recognizing fetal personhood.234 Frustrated again
with the gradual progress promised by incrementalism,
hardliners accused movement leaders of cowardice. Veteran
absolutist Judie Brown attacked opponents of the personhood
strategy for being “political [and] gutless.”235 “As a Catholic,”
she said, “[opposing a personhood strategy is] the most
scandalous thing I’ve ever heard.”236
The story of antiabortion litigation adds a new dimension
to studies of law and social change. As Part IV explores, the
case study developed in this article offers an opportunity to
reconsider the costs for social movements of either winning in
court or relying on legal rights.
IV. LITIGATION POLITICS
History offers an entry point into larger conversations
about law and social change. While still spotlighting litigation,
what Risa Goluboff calls the “new” legal history takes a
different path—identifying multiple interpreters of law outside
the courts and studying the difficulties inherent in the
233. See Mary C. Segers, The Pro-Choice Movement Post-Casey: Preserving
Access, in ABORTION POLITICS IN AMERICAN STATES 233 (Timothy Byrnes & Mary
Segers eds., 1995). For more on anti-clinic protest and violence, see WENDY
SIMONDS, ABORTION AT WORK: IDEOLOGY AND PRACTICE IN A FEMINIST CLINIC 7–
9 (1996).
234. For further discussion of contemporary conflict about the personhood
movement, see Lauren Markoe, After Mississippi Defeat, What About
Personhood?, CHRISTIAN CENTURY, Dec. 13, 2011, at 18; Cheryl Wetzstein, State
Abortion Curbs Rose in ‘11, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2012, at A6 (detailing
personhood battles in states like Mississippi and Colorado); Erik Eckholm, The
Christian Vote: “Personhood” Issue Hangs On, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2011, at A22
(explaining that the personhood movement was still active in spite of major defeat
in Mississippi).
235. James T. McCafferty, The Perils of Promoting Personhood, 79 NEW
OXFORD REV. 23, 24 (2012).
236. Id.
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interactions between social movements and attorneys.237
Litigation often figures centrally in these stories, as lawyers
modify and sometimes narrow the claims of those they
represent.238
As the history of antiabortion lawyering suggests,
litigation can also shift the balance of power in contests
between lay actors. Historians and legal scholars view the
advantages of litigation with some skepticism. Scholars like
Derrick Bell and William Rubenstein explore how the
individual interests vindicated in lawsuits can crowd out other
voices in large and diverse movements.239 By focusing on the
attorney-client relationship, historians like Risa Goluboff and
Kenneth Mack explore how litigation can overshadow certain
demands for change, including those involving socioeconomic
rights.240
Without disputing the drawbacks of litigation, legal
mobilization scholars highlight its important indirect effects.241
Litigation can help to mobilize new movement members and
energize those who have already joined the cause.242 Moreover,
activists use litigation to increase the salience of their cause,
raise funds from foundations and allies, build influence over
government officials, convince the public, and sway elites.243
237. See Risa Goluboff, Lawyers, Law, and the New Civil Rights History, 126
HARV. L. REV. 2312, 2322–23 (2013).
238. See id. at 2323 (summarizing current historical literature and arguing
that the new studies “practice[] a history that emphasizes connections between
laypeople and formal law—one that understands lawyers as mediators,
facilitators, and gatekeepers”).
239. See WILLIAM E. FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN
LABOR MOVEMENT 98–127 (1991); Derrick A. Bell, Serving Two Masters:
Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85
YALE L.J. 470, 476–77 (1976).
240. See BROWN-NAGIN, supra note 1, at 7–9; GOLUBOFF, supra note 1, at 11–
15; Kenneth W. Mack, Rethinking Civil Rights Lawyering and Politics in the Era
Before Brown, 115 YALE L.J. 256, 258 (2005).
241. For discussions of legal mobilization scholarship, see Douglas NeJaime,
Winning Through Losing, 96 IOWA L. REV. 941, 969–79 (2011); Ben Depoorter,
The Upside of Losing, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 817, 829–40 (2013).
242. See JOEL F. HANDLER, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM: A
THEORY OF LAW REFORM AND SOCIAL CHANGE 218 (1978); MICHAEL W. MCCANN,
RIGHTS AT WORK: PAY EQUITY REFORM AND THE POLITICS OF LEGAL
MOBILIZATION 58 (1994); STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS:
LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND POLITICAL CHANGE 147 (Univ. of Mich. Press 2d
ed. 2004) (1974); Thomas M. Keck, Beyond Backlash: Assessing the Impact of
Judicial Decisions on LGBT Rights, 43 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 151, 156–57 (2009).
243. See NeJaime, supra note 241, at 969–79; Depoorter, supra note 241, at
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Like legal mobilization scholarship, this study looks at
litigation’s indirect impact litigation. However, while legal
mobilization scholars often expose the value of court-centered
tactics, the history studied here showcases indirect effects that
are less obviously beneficial, or even harmful, to a movement.
This study also reinforces the conclusion that litigation can
reframe a cause, and the strategies used to pursue it, as legal
tactics and arguments gain favor. As this Article shows, courtcentered strategies influence more than the interactions of
lawyers and those they represent. Because of the progress
litigation promises, it can break the deadlock—defining
struggles between lay members over identity, coalition
building, and policy objectives.
A. The Perils of Progress
Recent legal scholarship makes a compelling case that
losing in court can have unexpected consequences.244 Far from
setting a movement back, litigation losses can help a movement
stake out an identity.245 Failure appears to energize activists
who are convinced that counter-majoritarian courts improperly
intervened.246 When courts refuse to act aggressively to create
the desired change, movements can more effectively seek a
remedy from legislatures, building on a traditional narrative
about the limitations of court-centered strategies.247
In contrast, some commentators are often deeply skeptical
about the indirect benefits of court-centered strategies.
According to these scholars, judicial victories can trigger
damaging backlashes.248 To win in court, movements use up
829–40.
244. See NeJaime, supra note 241, at 971–1007; Depoorter, supra note 241, at
829–40.
245. E.g., NeJaime, supra note 241, at 969–70, 979–80.
246. See id. at 986, 1006–07.
247. See id. at 986–87, 1006; Depoorter, supra note 241, at 818–19.
248. See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM THE CLOSET TO THE ALTAR: COURTS,
BACKLASH, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 166 (2013) (“Not only do
court decisions make people aware of previously unnoticed social change and force
politicians to take positions on issues they may have ducked, but they also force
substantive resolutions of policy issues that may be very different from those
supported by many voters. It is this aspect of judicial decisions that is the most
important cause of backlash.”); GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN
COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 425 (2d ed. 2008); Michael J. Klarman,
Brown and Lawrence (and Goodridge), 104 MICH. L. REV. 431, 473
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precious resources.249 By creating a false sense of security,
litigation can deradicalize movements, undermining the energy
that forces change.250 Such victories can legitimize a generally
unjust system.251 By directing attention to court-centered
strategies, litigation can also marginalize the movement’s
radical wing and empower the elites.252
By studying the history of antiabortion litigation, we can
see that the indirect benefits associated with litigation come
with costs of their own. Court-centered strategies can create
substantial path dependence. For both movement elites and
many grassroots radicals, the progress promised by litigation
proved irresistible. Success in court did not simply undercut
more effective tactics or silence the movement’s radical wing.
Rather, litigation victories also convinced a diverse group of
movement leaders to develop different approaches to lobbying,
street protests, and media work. The more the movement won,
the more activists committed to a strategy centered on judicial
activism. Defining this tactic as less radical than those pursued
earlier seems to miss an important part of the story. On the
one hand, abortion opponents strengthened their relationship
with social conservatives invested in a broad attack on changes
to sexual mores and family structures. On the other hand, the
movement gradually cast away transformative arguments for a
larger welfare state.
Instead of deradicalizing the movement, winning in court
gradually blinded abortion opponents to alternative identities,
legal goals, and rhetorical tactics. This path dependence had
important opportunity costs. As antiabortion activists invested
(2005) (arguing that court rulings cause backlash because “they alter the order in
which social change would otherwise have occurred”).
249. See Michael McCann & Helena Silverstein, Rethinking Law’s
“Allurements”: A Relational Analysis of Social Movement Lawyers in the United
States, in CAUSE LAWYERING: POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITIES 261, 261–92 (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds.,
1998); ROSENBERG, supra note 248, at 10–12, 420–29; SCHEINGOLD, supra note
242, at 49–53.
250. See FORBATH, supra note 239, at 128–36; Bell, supra note 239, at 476–77,
515–16; Sandra R. Levitsky, To Lead with Law: Reassessing the Influence of Legal
Advocacy Organizations in Social Movements, in CAUSE LAWYERS AND SOCIAL
MOVEMENTS 145, 145–63 (Austin Sarat & Stuart A. Scheingold eds., 2006).
251. See Catherine Albiston, The Dark Side of Litigation as a Social Movement
Strategy, 96 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 61, 64–66 (2011).
252. See, e.g., Levitsky, supra note 250, at 157; Albiston, supra note 251, at 74–
75.
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in a litigation-driven strategy, previously appealing options,
like those involving welfare legislation or protections for
pregnant women, gradually became less relevant or even
politically out of reach. By relying so heavily on one strategy,
one political party, and one set of allies, antiabortion activists
lost some of the flexibility and creativity that had defined the
early years of the movement. Increasingly, the movement rose
or fell with the fortunes of its partners on the Right.
At the same time, by helping to decide winners and losers
in the struggle over movement identity, litigation victories
marginalized influential movement strategists who were
disturbed by the direction the cause had taken. Moreover,
success in court further radicalized movement hardliners who
believed that their colleagues had taken a wrong turn.
Divisions between incrementalists and absolutists hobbled the
movement’s efforts to achieve constitutional change. By
committing so much to a single strategy, the movement became
more
homogenous,
drawing
supporters
from
fewer
communities.
Victory in court delivered just the kind of indirect benefit
long spotlighted by legal mobilization scholars. Just the same,
the movement’s investment in litigation successes foreclosed
other valuable political opportunities, pushing under the
surface alternative demands for change.
B. Decoupling Rights Talk and Litigation
Critics of social-change litigation take aim not only at
court-centered strategies but also at rights rhetoric. These
commentators argue that rights-based strategies can
deradicalize a movement, encouraging activists to seek a
legally viable remedy rather than what members actually
want.253 At the same time, by prioritizing rights talk,
movement members may set aside demands—particularly,
those for redistributive remedies and economic justice—that fit
poorly within a constitutional framework.254 When movements
253. For discussion of the deradicalizing effect of both litigation and rightsclaiming, see FORBATH, supra note 239 at 128–36; Albiston, supra note 251, at
64–66; Bell, supra note 239, at 476–77, 515–16; Levitsky, supra note 250, at 145–
63.
254. See William H. Simon, Rights and Redistribution in the Welfare System,
38 STAN. L. REV. 1431, 1440 (1986) (“A distinctive influence of the private rights
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succeed in securing rights, moreover, their rights-claiming may
legitimize an unjust system, demobilizing those who believe
that the struggle is over.255
Historians have added nuance to the story of rights
rhetoric, illuminating cases in which the language of rights
advanced radical social causes and showing how activists
brought together the language of legal rights and demands for
redistributive justice. Antiabortion history adds a valuable new
chapter to this narrative. From the very beginning, lay actors
and lawyers in the antiabortion movement relied heavily on
rights rhetoric and calls for constitutional change. This
emphasis on rights did not drown out radical voices or make
invisible demands for social economic justice; far from it.
Instead, rights language accommodated a wide variety of
surprising claims. Those committed to a broader social safety
net and a more robust protectionist state effectively used the
language of rights to advance their cause, challenging existing
social arrangements.256 Opponents of even the most
mainstream aspects of the sexual revolution also relied on
rights rhetoric to frame their beliefs and justify the social,
cultural, and economic status quo.257
Instead of finding themselves constrained by the language
of constitutional rights, antiabortion activists contested the
meaning of the right they championed. Distinguishing the
effects of litigation and rights rhetoric adds weight to
arguments that the language of rights can strengthen social
movements.
However, the history of antiabortion legalism cautions
against generalizations about the perils of litigation or the

approach on liberal welfare discourse has been to deemphasize, and even to
discourage, redistributive rhetoric and goals in liberal discussions of the welfare
system.”).
255. Roe itself has become a key example of the demobilizing effects of judicial
victories on social movements. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Civil Rights Legislation
in the 1990s: Three Civil Rights Fallacies, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 751, 766 (1991)
(arguing that Roe “spur[red] opposition and demobilize[ed] potential adherents”);
Robin West, From Choice to Reproductive Justice: De-constitutionalizing Abortion
Rights, 118 YALE L.J. 1394, 1409–13 (2009) (arguing that Roe legitimated existing
patterns of intimate conduct and established a “profoundly inadequate social
welfare net and hence the excessive economic burdens placed on poor women and
men who decide to parent”).
256. Supra Part II develops this argument at greater length.
257. Supra Part II further analyzes this history.
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virtues of rights talk. The appeal of litigation was only one of
several factors pushing the antiabortion movement toward a
focus on judicial activism. Political party realignment, the
emergence of new social conservative groups, the financial
struggles of the antiabortion movement, the rise of neoliberal
politics, and the declining popularity of the welfare state all
contributed to the transformation of antiabortion identity. The
lessons offered by antiabortion history tell us only about the
potential of litigation. A complex and ever-changing political
landscape also often changes the course of contests over what a
movement stands for.
At the same time, litigation can push aside competing
visions of a movement’s cause. The downsides of emphasizing
litigation—path dependence and the loss of certain strategic
alternatives—hamstrung the movement at a time when
abortion opponents played down earlier arguments about
constitutional rights.
CONCLUSION
Legal historians illuminate the complicated and everevolving relationships between lawyers and the communities
they represent. As the history of the antiabortion movement
shows, court-centered strategies can also make a difference to
internal struggles between lay activists. These struggles have
high stakes, determining what a cause means and who is more
likely to support it. By providing clear signals of progress,
victories in court convince movement members of the value of
certain strategies and the impracticality of others. However,
tactical debates can intersect with larger questions of ideology,
priorities, and identity. The indirect benefits guaranteed by
litigation can change the course of the contests about what a
movement represents.
The story of antiabortion identity contests adds depth to
debates about the value of litigation as a tool for social change.
Historians, political scientists, and legal commentators have
exposed the unanticipated costs of success in court. In addition
to triggering a backlash, litigation victories can silence radical
voices and demobilize activists convinced that the battle has
been won. Legal mobilization scholars complicate this
narrative, spotlighting the indirect benefits of either winning
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or losing in court.
At least for the antiabortion movement, these indirect
benefits came with a complex set of costs. Winning in court
vindicated the antiabortion cause, energized movement
members, and illuminated a potential path forward. For
activists desperate for signs of progress, the tactics used in
court promised further advances, even in the context of
lobbying, media interactions, or street protests. The more
activists won in court, the more movement leaders invested in
litigation, tailoring their larger lobbying and media strategy to
maximize the chances that Roe would be overruled. Over time,
in advancing court-centered strategies, movement members
put more emphasis on the overreaching of the Roe Court,
thereby framing their cause in a way that resonated with
potential allies on the Right. Those activists whose view of the
cause did not square with new, litigation-first tactics lost
influence. Over time, the movement lost some of the flexibility
that had helped it navigate the political landscape.
The movement’s story also adds weight to scholarship,
recognizing that rights rhetoric—by contrast to court-centered
tactics—can empower both social-change agents and
countermovement members. The right to life represented a
blank canvas onto which activists projected dramatically
different values. Far from deradicalizing movement demands,
right-to-life rhetoric made room for claims involving
socioeconomic rights, marital-status discrimination, and
equality between the sexes.
The effect of litigation on movement identity contests can
be long-lasting, as the story of antiabortion battles shows. In
the 1970s, a powerful group of abortion opponents demanded
both broader access to birth control and an expansion of the
welfare state. Today, activists holding similar views fight to
find a place in antiabortion politics. The alliance between
abortion opponents and the Republican Party has come to seem
inevitable and unchanging. Litigation played a central role in
bringing antiabortion politics to the present moment. As this
story reminds us, victory in court not only helps to determine
whether a social movement succeeds, but litigation also makes
a difference as to what that movement means.

